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Summary  findings
Gertler and Hammer examine how governments finance  cofinancing to improve the quality of curative care. More
and allocate public spending, with an eye to developing  important,  they can improve efficiency in the use of
strategies for pricing publicly provided health services.  public facilities and the health care system as a whole.
They also examine the implications of current policy and  But those gains must be weighed against evidence that
the possibility for rationalizing competing government  increased fees can compromise public health's three main
priorities. Because governments face budget constraints  goals. The literature has focused largely on how raising
and cannot fully subsidize all programs and activities,  revenue affects the poor, but the more important  effect is
Gertler and Hammer argue the following:  likely to be the guidance of resources. User fees are
Public spending on health can (1) improve health  important  in cofinancing health care but shouldn't  be the
outcomes, (2) promote nonhealth  aspects of well-being  primary means of finance.
(for example, reducing individuals' risk of economic  Revenue generated from user fees is sometimes used to
losses from random health crises), and (3) finance  improve the quality of, and access to, curative medical
redistribution to the poor. Optimal subsidy and fee  care. There is some evidence that people are willing to
policy will depend on how much relative weight  pay some of the cost of improving health care (especially
government places on those competing objectives.  for drugs), but the wealthy are willing to pay a lot more
Subsidies need to be reallocated toward the poor and  than the poor. If governments charge the average
toward public health, but only a fraction of the resources  "willingness to pay," the wealthy will use the services
needed to expand the health sector can be financed by  more, the poor,  less.
increasing public subsidies.  Prepayment social insurance plans hold promise, but
Prices for curative services (user fees) have two distinct  there is evidence that they may introduce inefficient
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be reallocated to public health activities and for limited  income countries cannot afford.
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- -1. Overview
Most  governments  spend  a large  amount  in  the  health  sector.  How  these  public
expenditures  are  financed  is a critical  element  of successful  health  policies,  because  it determines
the  budget  available  for public  activities  and  has  implications  for how  expenditures  are  allocated.
Public  expenditures  are  financed  from  both  public  and  private  sources,  with  public  subsidies  from
the  general  government  budget  supplemented  by  revenues  generated  from  private  individuals
through  user  fees. The  combination  affects  how  public  subsidies  are  allocated  across  programs
and  who  gets  the  subsidies.  Subsidy  allocation  decisions  also  determine  the  extent  to which  the
poor  are  cross-subsidized.  The  structure  of fees  provides  financial  incentives  that  affect  utilization
patterns  and  health  outcomes,  and  affects  how  well  individuals  are  insured  against  the  risk  of
large  economic  losses  associated  with  unexpected  illness.
In this  paper,  we  examine  the  way  governments  finance  and  allocate  public  expenditures.
Much  of the  policy  debate  has  focused  on  the  extent  to which  governments  are  able  to mobilize
private  resources  that  supplement  public  subsidies  in  financing  public  expenditures.  Proponents
of private  resource  mobilization  argue  that  individuals  are  willing  to pay  for medical  care  and  that
additional  financing  will  allow  governments  to  expand  and  improve  critical  programs  (e.g.  World
Bank,  1987;  Jimenez,  1996).  However,  opponents  argue  that  the  poor  are  unable  to pay  for
medical  care  and  will  be  worse  off  if governments  expand  private  resource  mobilization  (e.g.
Cornia,  Jolly  and  Stewart,  1987;  Gilson,  1991).
Most  of literature  contributing  to this  debate  has  focused  on  the  technical  issues  of how
much  money  can  be  mobilized,  and  what  is  the  impact  on  access  to medical  care  and  health
outcomes.  While  informative,  this  literature  does  not  fully  prescribe  optimal  policy.  Optimal  policy
needs  to be  based  in  terms  of  the  benefit  the  policy  would  have  for society  above  and  beyond
what  would  have  happened  without  public  intervention.  The  benefit  of a proposed  policy  is the
extent  to which  the  policy  ameliorates  individual  and  social  losses  from  private  market  failures.
Priorities  should  be  based  not  only  the  effectiveness  of the  policy,  but  also  on  the importance
governments  place  on  the  types  of losses  and  the  individuals  who  incur  the losses.
We  examine  the  implications  of current  policy  and  possibilities  for  policy  reform  in  the
context  of competing  government  priorities.  Governments  can  intervene  to  correct  private  market
failures  that  cause  health  outcomes  to be  lower  than  they  otherwise  could  be,  cross-subsidize  the
poor's  access  to medical  care,  and  correct  insurance  and  medical  care  market  failure.  Since
governments  have  budget  constraints,  they  cannot  fully  subsidize  all programs  and  activities.  In
this  paper,  we  argue  the  following:
Public  expenditures  in  the  health  sectors  of countries  can  achieve  important  social
goals  of:  a) improving  health  outcomes  b) promoting  non-health  aspects  of  well-being,
for  example  by insuring  that  individuals  are  not  at risk  for large  unexpected  economic
losses  associated  with  random  adverse  health  events  and  c) financing  redistribution
to the  poor.  Optimal  subsidy  and  fee  policy  will  differ  depending  on  how  much  relative
weight  government  places  on  these  competing  objectives.  Subsidies  need  to be
reallocated  toward  the  poor  and  toward  public  health  programs.  However,  only  a
fraction  of the  resources  needed  to expand  the  health  sector  can  be  financed  through
increasing  public  subsidies.
Prices  for  curative  services  (user  fees)  have  two  distinct  roles. They  can  raise
revenue,  freeing  public  resources  that  can  be  reallocated  to public  health  activities
and  for  limited  co-financing  of curative  care  quality  improvements.  But  perhaps  more
importantly,  they  can  improve  efficiency  in  the  use  of public  facilities  and  of the  health
care  system  as  a whole.  However,  the  gains  must  be  weighed  against  existing
evidence  that  increased  fees  can  compromise  the  goals  mentioned  above.  The
literature  has  tended  to focus  on  raising  revenue  (and  its consequences  on  the  poor)
whereas  the  more  important  effect  is  likely  to be  the  guidance  of resources.  In
1general,  user  fees at point  of service  serve  an important  role  in co-financing  health
care, but not as the primary  means  of  finance.
*  There is evidence  that revenue  generated  from user  fees are sometimes  used  to.
finance  improvements  in quality  and  access  to curative  medical  care. There  is some
empirical  support  to the notion  that individuals  are willing  to pay  at least  a share  of the
cost  of improvements  in access  and  quality,  especially  for drugs. However,  the
wealthy  are  willing  to pay a lot more  than  the poor. Therefore,  if governments  charge
the "average  willingness  to pay"  to finance  quality  improvements,  utilization  of the
wealthy  will increase  and utilization  of the poor  will fall.
*  Optimal  policies  will also  depend  on the behavior  of consumers,  private  providers  and
civil  servants. The first two determine  the market  environment  in which policies
operate  - defining  limits  to or, sometimes,  additional  opportunities  for what  can be
achieved. The last determines  the abilities  of governments  to implement  policies.  We
should  not  expect  optimal  policies  from one  context  to generalize  to all. Countries
differ  significantly  by the relative  weights  of the  goals  of policy,  and by the constraints
they  face in the extent  of their resources  and in the nature  of the reactions  of markets.
Serious  policy  formation  must rest  on considerably  more  analysis  relative  to ideology
than  has characterized  debates  on  the  topic.
*  Social  insurance  (SI)  plans,  which  enable  govemments  to mobilize  private  resources
for the health  sector  by prepayment  and  charging  for health  services  provided  to
beneficiaries,  holds  promise,  particularly  for middle  and  upper-income  countries.
These  schemes  mobilize  private  resources  with no loss in the insurance  value  of the
public  health  care  system. Price  discrimination  is easier,  because  it can be
centralized  and it only  needs  to be  done  periodically  outside  the pressure  of having  to
treat  an illness. While  prepayment  plans  hold promise,  there is evidence  that  they
introduce  inefficient  medical  care  cost  inflation  that lower  and middle  income  countries
may  not be  able  to afford.
This paper  is organized  as follows. In section  2,  we discuss  the role  fees play  in the
budgetary  process.  We consider  how  fees can  stretch  the  govemments  budget  available  for
expenditures  on various  programs  and how  fees can  be used  to allocate  public  subsidies  to
programs.  From  this discussion  comes  a set of conditions  that  determine  how  fees affect
budgetary  flexibility-most of which  concern  how  price  and  quality  affect utilization.  In section  3,
we review  the empirical  literature  on  utilization.  While  information,  section's  2 and 3 are not  about
prescribing  optimal  policy. Rather  they describe  the  options  and  trade-offs. In section  4, we use
this information  to discuss  optimal  fee  policy  depending  on  government  objectives.
2. THE  ROLE OF FEES  IN THE  BUDGETARY  PROCESS
Public  expenditures  in the health  sector  are financed  out  of two sources:  allocations  from the
general  govemment  budget  (general  tax revenues  and  donor  assistance)  and revenues  from
private  resources.  In many  cases,  especially  in lower  and middle  income  countries,  the public
sector  collects  private  revenues  through  fees charged  at the point  of service.
Much  of  the literature  justifies  increasing  user  fees in terms  of resource  mobilization  (or
cost  recovery)  and in terms  of  providing  incentives  for more  efficient  use of public  medical  care
services  (e.g. World  Bank,  1987).  However,  an  equally  important  role is to determine  the
allocation  of public  subsides  from  the general  government  budget  across  services  (e.g.
hospitalization,  primary  care,  vector  control)  and  types  of individuals  (e.g.  poor, children,  etc.).
The allocation  of the subsidies  is one  of the  major  policy  instruments  that governments  have  to
correct  health  care  market  failures  and  improve  welfare.
2In this section,  we describe  the  role  of user  fees in determining  the  government's  budget
constraint. The  structure  of fees not  only  determines  the  amount  of  total resources  available  and
how much  is spent  on each program,  but  also  the extent  to which  a particular  program's
expenditures  are publicly  subsidized  out  of the general  government  budget. Finally,  it is important
to remember  that this discussion  is limited  to how  fees affect  the budget  that  constrains
governments'  choices. It says nothing  about  which  programs  should  be  funds,  how  much  to
spend  on them,  and how  much  of the expenditure  should  be  financed  out of public  subsidies.
That discussion  requires  information  on the benefits  of  the allocations  and  the objectives  of
government  intervention.  That discussion  is provided  in section  5.
This section  is organized  as follows. In subsections  2.1  and  2.2,  we discuss  the resource
mobilization  role  of fees in the public  budgetary  process. In subsection  2.3,  we argue  that  setting
user  fees not  only  mobilizes  resources,  but  also  affects  how  public  subsidies  are used. Finally,  in
subsection  2.4,  we address  a critical  design  issue-namely that fee revenues  be retained,  at least
in part, by the organization  that collects  them.
2.1  The Budget Constraint
Most  of the resource  allocation  decisions  that public  health  care systems  must  make  are
related  to one  another  through  the  government's  budget  constraint.  The two major  categories  of
decisions  are:
*  What  are services  to offer and  at what  quality?,  and
*  What  is the user  fee or co-payment  for each  service?
These  decisions  are relevant  to all levels  of government  where  officials  have  to make
finance  and resource  allocation  decisions.  In many  countries  decisions  are made  at very high
levels  of govemment  either  at the central  or provincial  levels. However,  other  countries  are
devolving  resource  allocation  and  financing  decisions  to the local  levels. The analysis  below
applies  to local  officials  and  public  facility  level managers  as well as central  and  provisional
officials. The extent  to which it applies  to the local  level  depends  on  the degree  of autonomy  in
the system.
The level  of  services  and  the  fee structure  cannot  be  set independent  of one another,  but
rather  must  be  set so as to satisfy  the budget  constraint-i.e. total  expenditures  must  be less  than
or equal  to total revenues.  In the budget  constraint,  revenues  come  from public  subsidies  from
general  tax revenues-i.e. allocations  from  the  general  public  budget  plus  donor assistance-and
from user  charges  for services  provided.  This budget  is spent  on administrative  costs,  inpatient
services,  outpatient  services,  and public  health  disease  prevention  and  control  activities.
Government  spending  in health  covers  a wide range  of services  from public  health
activities  such  as the prevention  and  treatment  of communicable  diseases  to curative  services
that benefit  only  the individual.  Expenditures  on some  programs  depend  on the  number  of
individuals  who  demand  care-i.e.  hospitalization,  primary  care, prenatal  care,  etc. While  there
may  be short  term rationing  of these  services,  the public  sector  is typically  under  obligation  to
provide  these  services  to all who  show up  for them. The costs  of other programs,  such  as mass
information  campaigns  and  vector  control  programs,  do not  depend  on the number  of users. In
many  cases, the amount  of funds  available  from  these  programs  is determined  residually  to the
amount  spent  on patient  services  both  prevention  and  treatment.
The budget  constraint,  which  sets  expenditures  equal  to revenues,  can be  expressed  as:
A+ZCI,UU  + COULo  + CDC=fj, Uj,  +  fouO  U+G
i  i  ii
where:  A  = Administrative  costs
C,,  = Cost of Inpatient  Service  i
3Uy,  = Utilization  of Inpatient  Service  i
c,o  = Cost  of Outpatient  Service  i
U,o  = Utilization  of Outpatient  Service  I
CDC  = Expenditures  on  Programs  that  are not Utilization  Driven
(e.g. vector  control,  research,  sanitation,  water  treatment),
fnl  = User  Fee Charged  for Inpatient  Service  i
fio  = User  Fee Charged  for Outpatient  Service  i
G  = Subsidies  from  the  general  tax revenues
Many  policy makers  promote  user  fees as a means  of mobilizing  private  resources  for
public  expenditures.  It is important  to note  that charging  user  fees is not  the same  as forcing
individuals  to pay out  of pocket.  We are defining  user  fees  as the  price received  by the facility  of
program  which is not necessarily  what  individuals  pay  at the point  of services. Indeed,  individuals
could  contribute  to prepayment  or insurance  plans  to finance  their  payment  of fees at  the time of
treatment. Moreover,  there is no reason  why the  fees need  to be paid  to providers  in the form of
fee-for-service.  Prepayment  and  insurance  plans  could  just as easily pay  providers  by capitation.
However,  since insurance  affects  individual's  utilization  decisions  and the  form of payment  affects
provider  behavior,  the source  and  form of payment  need  to be  taken into  account  when  deciding
on  the structure  of  fees.
While  the  above  characterization  of  the public  budget  constraint  is described  in the
context  of a centralized  decision  making  process,  it easily  generalizes  to a more  decentralized
structure.  The simplest  and  most  efficient  budgetary  model  is where  the organization  that collects
the fee revenues  keeps  them  and is free to use them  as it sees  fit. In this case,  fee revenues
expand  available  resources  and local  managers,  if competent  and  publicly  motivated,  can use  the
resources  most  efficiently  to improve  welfare. In this case,  the central  government  has to decide
on how  to allocate  its public  subsides  from  the central  budget  among  national  programs  and  to
lower  levels  of government  (e.g. provinces,  districts,  states,  countries).  These  lower  levels of
government  then combine  these  allocations  with resources  from the  subsidies  from the local
budget  and decide  how  to allocate  the combined  resources  among  facilities  and local  programs.
Then each  facility  and  program,  combines  these  allocations  with fee revenue  and makes
expenditure  allocation  decisions  among  programs  and  services.  Thus,  each  decision-maker  in
the process  receives  an  allocation  from a higher  level  of government-G in the above  equation-
and  then combines  it with local  resources  to finance  its expenditures.
2.2 Resource  Mobilization.
The classic  formulation  of resource  mobilization  is to raise  prices  (user  fees)  to generate
private  revenues  that  can be used  to finance  a service  or finance  improvements  in the quality  of
that service.  The practice  of charging  user  fees  for medical  services  at public  facilities  has been
adopted  throughout  much  of the  world  (Griffin,  1987;  Nolan  and Turbut,  1995;  Jimenez,  1996).
However,  the fee  structure  and  control  over revenues  varies  greatly  across  settings.
Much  of  the evaluation  of resource  mobilization  focuses  on cost-recovery-i.e. the
percentage  of total  costs.  However,  it is not  clear  how  to evaluate  when  cost-recovery  ratios  are
too low. In particular,  the value  of private  resources  needs  to be  measured  in terms  of freeing  up
scarce  public  subsidies  to be reallocated  to higher  priority  programs  such  as contagious  disease
prevention  and  vector  control,  and  in terms  of providing  facility  managers  with enough  additional
resources  to make  the difference  between  effective  and ineffective  treatment-in many  cases
drugs.  The value  depends  on the  extent  to which  the funds  provide  needed  budgetary  flexibility  at
the margin  where  small  amounts  of money  go a long  way.
4Creese  and Kutzin  (1995)  examine  national  cost-recovery  ratios  from 15 (mostly  African)
countries  and  find  that 11  of them  have  fee revenues  that  finance  less  than  5 percent  of public
sector  expenditures. While  these numbers  are substantially  below  the 10  to 20 percent  potential
cited in the 1987  World  Bank  Health  Sector  Financing  Report,  it is hard to evaluate  these  data
outside  of the  institutional  and policy  environments  of the  countries. A number  of questions  come
to mind. For  example,  how  do these  cost  recovery  ratios  compare  to government  targets  and how
much  potential  revenue  is not  being  collected  and  why. Many  countries  do not  allow local  units  to
retain  and spend  the fees,  and put  few resources  into  administrating  and  monitoring  collection. In
addition,  the  data sources  for these  figures  are  typically  national  information  systems  that many
times  suffer  from serious  under-reporting.
These  data  do not  imply  that  well designed  and  administered  programs  cannot  mobilize
resources,  just that  many  countries  did not  have  the political  will  to do so. For example,  China
has  been  extremely  successful  in mobilizing  resources  through  fees  (World  Bank,  1996). Even
back  in 1978,  before  recent  reforms  were initiated,  subsidies  from general  tax revenues  financed
only  28 percent  of total public  health  sector  expenditures.  In 1993,  public  subsidies  were  reduced
to 14 percent  of total public  health  sector  expenditures.  The rest  was  financed  through  fees
charged  both  insured  and  uninsured  patients. Indeed,  one  can find higher  cost-recovery  ratios
when  one  examines  local  initiatives  where  the revenue  is typically  retained  and  where  it is easier
to implement  and  evaluate  resource  mobilization  efforts. For  example,  in 1993  the revenues  from
fees charged  insured  and uninsured  accounted  for 91 percent  of hospitals  expenditures  and  84
percent  of health  center  expenditures  in China  (World  Bank,  1996). In  Viet Nam,  private  revenues
amounted  to 36.5  percent  in 1995  (Gertler  and  Solon,  1996). In Senegal,  private  revenues
amounted  to 127  percent  of recurrent  expenditures  in health  centers  (UNICEF/BIMU,  1995).
Similar  examples  of high percentages  of private  financing  of recurrent  costs are reported  in Latin
America,  and  elsewhere  (Richardson  et al., 1992;  Olave  et al., 1992;  Barum  and Kutzin,  1993;
Lewis,  1993). In  addition,  McPake,  Hanson  and Mills  (1993)  found  that  in a number  of African
countries  drug fee revenues  were  used  to obtain  tangible  improvements  in health  services.
However,  the  evidence  that some  locales  are mobilizing  substantial  resources  does not
account  for the administrative  costs  of  collecting  the  fees including  the time (opportunity)  costs of
administering  fee exemption  policies.  There  is little  if any credible  data  on this important  issue. As
noted  by Creese  and Kutzin  (1995),  most  assessments  take place  in the context  of schemes  that
have  been  funded  through  external  assistance  which  biases  down  the  estimates  of real  world
administrative  costs.
The extent  to which raising  fees mobilizes  private  resources  depends  on  the extent  to
which individuals  are willing  to pay  the higher  price  for the  services. Patients  are not  willing  to pay
any amount  for curative  care. As fees rise,  utilization  will fall; The question  is by how  much?  The
less  sensitive  demand  increases  is to price  increases-i.e. the more  price  elastic', the  more
revenue  is mobilized  through  increases  in fees. This is because  price  increase  has  two effects  on
revenues.  It increases  revenues  by raising  the revenue  per  visit, but it lowers  revenues  by
reducing  visits.  If the reduction  in visits  is great  enough,  then  price increases  actually  reduce
revenues.  Similarly,  the less  sensitive  in  demand,  the less prices  will change  service  use.
The story is somewhat  more  complicated  with  respect  to increasing  user  fees to finance
improvements  in quality. In this case,  there  are two effects  on utilization-the negative  effects  of
the price increase  and  the positive  effect  of the quality  increase. Both  need  to be  measured  to
assess  the amount  of resources  that  can be mobilized.  The less price  elastic  and the more  quality
'Price  elasticities  are  negative  indicating  that  demand  falls  as  prices  rise. If  the  price  elasticity  is  small,  between  0 and  -
1,  then  demand  is  said  to  be  inelastic  as  the  percentage  reduction  in  demand  is  less  than  the  percentage  increase  in
price.  When  demand  is  inelastic,  price  increases  raise  revenues  since  the  positive  price  effect  is  larger  than  the  negative
demand  effect.  When  the  price  elasticity  is  large,  less  than  -1,  then  demand  is  said  to be  elastic  and  increases  in price
reduce  revenues  because  the  negative  demand  effect  outweighs  the  positive  price  effect.  Finally,  when  demand  is
unitary  elastic,  equal  to  -1,  the  percentage  decrease  in  demand  is  exactly  equal  to  the  percentage  increase  in  price  and
there  is  no  change  in  revenues.
5elastic  is the demand,  the more  the resources  that can be  mobilized  from a fee increase  used  to
finance  a quality  improvement.
2.3 Allocating  Public  Subsidies.
In  this section,  we will show  that  while  fees may  be  able to mobilize  private  resources,
they also  determine  the allocation  of public  subsidies.  This point  is extremely  important  since  it is
through  the allocation  of these  public  subsidies  that  the  government  is able to pursue  its
objectives  and correct  market  failures. Increases  in fees  free up subsidies  that can be reallocated
to other programs.  The more  subsidies  a given  fee increase  frees up,  the greater  the
government's  budgetary  flexibility  in allocating  subsidies.  Interestingly,  we will show  that  the
condition  that leads  to more budgetary  flexibility  is exactly  the  opposite  of the  condition  that
mobilizes  more private  resources-namely,  the  more price  elastic  in demand,  the  greater  the
amount  of subsidies  that  are freed up.
To see this,  we rewrite  the  budget  constraint  as follows:
A +  Cj,  - fil )Ui. +  (cul  - fil )Uio + CDC = G
i  i
where (c,#  - fjj) is the public  subsidy  rate  per unit  of a service.  Then  the amount  of  public  subsidies
spent  on a public  program  is the  subsidy  rate  times  the amount  of services  provided. In  this
formulation  of the budget  constraint,  administrative  costs  plus  the sum  of subsidies  to each  of the
services  and  public  health  program  costs  cannot  exceed  total subsidies  allocated  from the general
government  budget.
There  are a number  of  ways the  government  might  want  to reallocate  its public  subsidies.
Consider  increasing  public  spending  on public  health  activities  such  as vector  control  or
sanitation-i.e. CDC spending. In  order  to increase  CDC  expenditures,  the govemment  must
reduce  subsidies  to other  programs  otherwise  it would  spend  more than  its available  resources
and violate  the budget  constraint.  To do so, it raises  the fee  for those  services  thereby  reducing
lowering  the subsidy  rate for existing  beneficiaries  of the program  and inducing  some  to stop
using  the  service.
The amount  of subsidies  that can be  reallocated  depends  on the amount  freed up  by the
price increase  which  depends  on how  sensitive  utilization  is to price.  The more  price  elastic
demand,  the  greater  the fall in utilization  for a given  price  increase. Therefore,  the greater  the
amount  of subsidies  that can  be reallocated  through  reductions  in both  unit subsidies  and  in
volume  provided. In  essence,  the  more price  elastic  demand,  the more  easily  the government  can
reallocate  subsidies-i.e. the greater  its budgetary  flexibility. However,  the more  price  elastic
demand,  the  fewer  the amount  of private  resources  that  can be mobilized.
Another  reallocation  priority  maybe  to  shift  subsidies  from a lower  priority  patient  care
program  to another  higher  priority  care  program. In  order  to increase  public  subsidies  to a care
program,  the government  lowers  the  fee charged  thereby  increasing  the  subsidy  rate. The
amount  of public  subsidies  going  to that  program  increases  for two reasons. First,  existing  users
of the program  get  a higher  subsidy  rate. Second  the lower  fee  attracts  new  users  who  otherwise
would  not have  gotten  the subsidy.  Again,  in order  to increase  subsidies  to a program,  the
government  must reduce  subsidies  to other  lower  priority  programs.  As before,  it lowers
subsidies  by raising  the  fee for those  low priority  services  thereby  reducing  lowering  the subsidy
rate  for existing  beneficiaries  of the  program  and inducing  some  to stop using  the  service. This
discussion  implies  that reallocating  public  subsidies  across  care programs  is a careful  balance  of
raising  and  lowering  user  fees.
2.4 Revenue Retention.
An important  assumption  in this discussion  is that  any revenues  raised  from private
sources  are kept  in the health  sector. If the  fee revenue  must  be  returned  to the  general  treasury,
6then resources  effectively  are not increased  through  the fee increase;  the same holds  for local
health  units  who  are forced  to return  revenues  to central Ministries  of Health.  It is as if the
government  lowered  public  subsidies  by one  dollar  for every  dollar  raised  privately. Not only  does
this imply  that  no resources  are mobilized,  but  there is no  incentive  for the health  sector  to collect
these fees  and substantially  less  revenue  than  could  be  raised  is actually  collected-an important
administrative  issue  in implementing  a successful  user  fee  strategy.
In reality,  while fee  revenues  are collected  at the local  level,  the claim  on  the use is likely
to be  at higher  levels  of government.  In the  worse  case,  fee revenues  just leave  the  health  sector
and are returned  to the  central  or local  treasuries  so that  they do not  expand  health  sector
resources.  For  example,  Creese  and  Kutzin  (1995)  report  that  this is the case  in African  countries
such  as Eritrea,  Ethiopia,  Namibia  and  Zimbabwe.
A more  subtle  case  which  is harder  to document  is where  the  fee revenues  just displace
public  subsidies  by one  dollar  for every  dollar  of fee revenue  raised. Indeed,  Leighton  (1995)  cites
Cambodia,  Chile,  China,  Iran,  Jordan,  Nepal,  and  Thailand  of cases  where Ministries  of Health
budgets  have reduced  as fee revenues  increase. In  contrast,  Kenya  and  the Central  African
Republic  sought  and  received  explicit  assurances  from their  Ministries  of Finance  that public
subsidies  would  not be  reduced  before  they restructured  fees.
In both  the  direct  and subtle  cases,  fee  revenues  do not  augment  the policy-makers'  and
facility  managers'  abilities  to expand  and improve  programs.  Rather,  user  fees become  just a
method  of reducing  public  subsidies  to the health  sector.
Even  when  the  fee revenues  remain  in the health  sector,  many  governments  do not  allow
local  facilities  and programs  control  of the  funds. In many  countries,  this is because  local  facility
and program  managers  do not  have  authority  on how  to spend  resources.  For  example,
manpower  and infrastructure  decisions  are usually  handled  at higher  levels.  At best local
managers  can alter  the mix of  drugs  and  supplies. However,  few are allowed  to shift resources
between  budgetary  items. The reasons  for this lack  of local  control  in these  countries  include  lack
of budgetary  skills  and concern  over  graft. However,  as the current  decentralization  trend gathers
steam,  this rationale  may  diminish.
Indeed,  one reason  to speed  the  decentralization  process  is that it improves  the efficiency
with  which fees  are collected.  The point  is that  just because  of a government  mandates  that  fees
will be charged  doesn't  mean  that facilities  and programs  will  actually  collect  the fees and  remit
them back  to the government.  Indeed,  if revenues  are simply  passed  onto higher  authorities,  then
there is little  or no positive  incentive  to collect  them. All  that remains  is the  threat  of audit  and
punishment,  which is costly  and rarely  credible. If, on  the other hand,  local  facilities  and  programs
are able  to keep  and  use  at least  some  of the revenues,  then  there is an incentive  to collect  them.
Despite  the strength  of this argument,  there has  been  little  systematic  evaluation  of  the
hypothesis  that  fee retention  increase  the efficiency  of  collection. There  have  been  a few case
studies,  such  as Chisvo  and  Munro  (1994)  in  Zimbabwe,  that raise  this a reason  that only  a small
percentage  of public  health  sector  expenditures  are  financed  through  fee revenue. In  a study  of
Africa,  Nolan  and  Turbot  (1995)  present  cross-national  comparisons  of percentages  of public
expenditures  financed  through  fee revenues  and  cannot  find a correlation  with  fee retention
authority. However,  the comparisons  are not  clear  and  many  other  factors  including  differential
fee policies  could  confound  the observed  cross-national  relationship.
However,  there is some  evidence  on the expenditure  side  that local  control  is important.
Parker  and Knippenberg  (1991)  examined  14  countries  experiences  under  the Bamako  Initiative
and  found  that in the  cases  where  there  were  increases  in local  management  of resources,  there
was availability  of essential  medical  care  inputs  improve  and utilization  increased.  Mwabu  et al.
(1994)  noted  that  while revenues  from a 1989  fee increase  were largely  locally  retained,  the
central  treasury  retained  authority  over  spending.  As a result,  40 percent  of Kenyan  facilities
reported  that  they did not spend  the revenues.
73. THE EFFECT  OF PRICES  ON THE  BUDGET  AND INDIVIDUAL  WELFARE?
In this section  we examine  the empirical  evidence  on extent  to which public  health  care  systems
are able to mobilize  private  resources,  budgetary  flexibility  to reallocate  public  subsidies,  and the
consequences  of these policies  on overall  access  to medical  care  and  health  outcomes.  This first
two issues  boil  down  to how  much  does  raising  a fee lower  utilization.  In subsection  3.1  where we
review  the empirical  evidence  on how  increases  in prices  affect  the utilization  of the institution  that
raises  the price-i.e. the  own  price  elasticities  of demand.
Whether  inelastic  demand  is good  or bad,  depends  on  what the  govemment  wants  to do.
In the case  of reallocating  subsidies  from  one program  to another,  the more  a given  fee increase
reduces  utilization,  the greater  the amount  of subsidies  that  can be  reallocated.  In the  case,  of
raising  fees  to finance  a program,  the  more price  inelastic  demand,  the greater  the  amount  of
resources  that can be mobilized.  In  the case  of raising  fees  to finance  improvements  in quality,
the less  the fee increase  reduces  utilization  and  the more  the  quality  improvement  raises
utilization,  the  greater  the amount  of resources  mobilized.  In  this case,  we are essentially  asking
how  much  are individuals  willing  to pay  for the quality  improvements  which is examined  in
subsection  3.2.
It is important  to remember  that the  discussion  in subsections  3.1 and  3.2 should  be
interpreted  only  in terms  of implications  for the budget  and  in terms  of  welfare. Just  because  we
observe  a decrease  in utilization  of public  facilities  does not  mean  that access  to all medical  care
or health  outcomes  were reduced.  For  example,  the  price increase  could  have induced  individuals
to substitute  private  sector  care  for public  sector  care,  thereby  not  reducing  access.  In  addition,
those for whom  the price  increase  caused  them  not  to seek  care  at all, may have  had  only minor
illnesses  that did require  treatment  or could  easily  be  treated  at home. The point  is that the own
price  effects  tell us nothing  about  access  and  health  outcomes,  only  about resource  mobilization
and  budgetary  flexibility  in allocating  public  subsidies.  We investigate  the effects  of price
increases  on access  and  health  outcomes  in subsection  3.3.
Finally,  we note  with  caution  that  none  of  the discussion  in this section  is devoted  to what
governments  should  do. This  discussion  provides  information  of the budgetary  constraints  on
govemment  action  and implications  of actions  on outcomes.  To take the  discussion  a step
further,  we need  to understand  the objectives  of govemment  policy. This is the subject  of section
4.
3.1 The Price Elasticity of the Demand  for Medical  Care.
There have  been  a large  number  of studies  that have  tried  to estimate  the price  elasticity
of demand  for outpatient  services  using  cross-sectional  household  surveys  (Table  1). While  a few
early studies  with  questionable  data  found  completely  inelastic  demand  (i.e.  no effect  of price  on
utilization),  most  report  that  higher  prices  are associated  with lower  utilization,  but  that  overall  own
price  elasticities  are low and  well below  unity. This suggest  that  increases  in fees  will mobilize
substantial  private  revenues,  but  that  flexibility  in reallocating  subsidies  is limited.
Another  important  result  coming  out  of a number  of these  studies  is that price  sensitivity
differs  among  economic  and  demographic  groups. In  particular,  the poor  appear  to be more price
sensitive  than  the wealthy,  and  children's  utilization  seems  to be price  sensitive  than adults'
utilization.  This means  that increasing  in fees may  reduce  the utilization  of  the poor  and children
by more.
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Econometric Estimates  of Own Price Elasticities of
the Demand  For Medical  Care in Developing Countries
Country  Data  Service  Type  Own  Price  Elasticity  Source
Overall  Low  High
Income  Income
Burkina  Faso  1985  Public  Provider  Sauerbom  et al. (1994)
All Ages  -0.79  -1.44  -0.12
Age 0-1  -3.64
Age 1-  -1.73
14
Age 15+  -0.27
Cot. d'lvoire  1985  Health  Clinic  -0.61  -0.38  Gertler  & Van  der Gaag  (1990)
Hospital  Outpatient  -0.47  -0.29
Cot. d'lvoire  1985-87  Health  Clinic  -0.37  Dow  (1996)
Hospital  Outpatient  -0.15
Ghana  1987  Hospital  Inpatient  -1.82  Lavy  & Quigley  (1993)
Hospital  Outpatient  -0.25
Dispensary  -0.34
Pharmacy  -0.20
Health  Clinic  -0.22
Kenya  1980-81  Government  -0.10  Mwabu  et al. (1993)
provider
Mission  provider  -1.57
Private  provider  -1.94
Indonesia  1991-93  Gertler  and  Molyneaux  (1997)
Children  Health  Center  -1.07
Health  Subcenter  -0.35
Adults  Health  Center  -1.04
Health  Subcenter  -0.47
Elderly  Health  Center  -0.47
Health  Subcenter  -0.11
Mali  1982  -0.98  Birdsall  et al. (1983)
Nigeria  Akin et al. (1995)
Pakistan  1986  Alderman  & Gertler  (1997)
Female  Traditional  Healer  -0.43  -0.24
Children  Public  Clinic  -0.43  -0.23
Pharmacist  -0.44  -0.25
Private  Doctor  -0.17  -0.09
Male  Traditional  Healer  -0.60  -0.26
Children  Public  Clinic  -0.61  -0.27
Pharmacist  -0.63  -0.27
Private  Doctor  -0.25  -0.10
Peru  1985  Private  Doctor  -0.44  -0.12  Gertler  & Van der Gaag
(1990)
Hospital  Outpatient  -0.67  -0.33
Health  Clinic  -0.76  -0.30
Philippines  1981  Public  Providers  -2.26  -1.28  Chin  (1995)
Private  Providers  -3.93  -2.23
Philippines  1981  Prenatal  Care  -0.01  Akin  et al. (1986)
Philippines  1983-84  Urban  Matemity  -0.24  Schwatz  et al. (1988)
Rural  Maternity  -0.05
However,  policy  makers  need  to  view the  results  of these  studies  with some  caution,
since  the  studies  suffer  from several  methodological  problems.  First,  the  countries  studied
typically  had  public  institutions  that  charged  very low  fees  with little  geographical  variation  in those
fees. In some  of these  studies,  the investigators  used  travel  costs  to measure  the price
elasticities,  since  time  costs ration  the market  when  fees are low. These  studies  used  the
estimated  models  of  demand  to conduct  policy  simulations  that  forecast  how increases  in fees are
likely  to affect  utilization  and  revenues.  However,  the  forecasts  were  based  on price  changes  well
9outside  the observed  range  of the price  data  and  are, therefore,  highly  unreliable.  In particular,
while individual's  utilization  decisions  may  be insensitive  to prices  at low levels  of prices,  they
might  be very sensitive  to prices  when  prices  are big.
A number  of studies  have  evaluated  actual  price  increases  by comparing  utilization  before
and  after a fee increase  at public  facilities.  In  the  Ashanit-Akim  region  of Ghana,  Waddington  and
Enyimayew  (1990)  found  that  after an  increase  in user  fees, long-term  utilization  fell at clinics
serving  poor  patients  but  that  utilization  at clinics  serving  non-poor  did not. Mwabu  et al. (1995)
reports  a 52 percent  decrease  in outpatient  visits  to government  health  centers  after the
introduction  of fees in Kenya  in 1989. After  suspension  of  the fees in 1990,  visits  increased  by 41
percent  close  the original  level. Yoder  (1989)  reports  a 32 percent  reduction  in visits  to
government  health  care  facilities  after  a fee increase  in Swaziland.  Greene  (1994)  reports  a 50
percent  fall in utilization  at primary  health  units  after the introduction  of a consultation  fee at
government  clinics in Mozambique.  Kahenya  and  Lake (1994)  report  that  attendance  to 11  clinics
in Zambia  fell on average  64 percent  with larger  reductions  occurring  at facilities  located  in poorer
areas. Finally,  Bennett  (1989)  reported  drops  of  40 to 51 percent  in the utilization  of  government
facilities  after they increased  fees in Lesotho,  and  that  the drops  were greatest  among  children.
However,  one  needs  to interpret  these event  history  studies  with a note  of extreme
caution. While  the results  of these  studies  are consistent  with the  econometric  findings  that
demand  is sensitive  to price,  but  they only  report  the  fall in utilization  and  say little  about  the
degree  of price  elasticity. Large  falls could  be  associated  with big price  increases  so that demand
is still relatively  price insensitive.  Moreover,  these  studies  lack  control  groups  where fees  did not
change,  so one doesn't  know  how  much  of the  fall in utilization  was due  to the price increase  and
how  much  was due  to other  factors  such  as change  in quality  or changes  in the disease
environment.
Most  of the results  discussed  so far analyze  data  that  reflects  the rules  that governments
use to set prices  and  locate  facilities  (Rosensweig  and  Wolpin,  1986;  Pitt,  Rosenswieg  and
Gibbons,  1993;  Gertler  and Molyneaux,  1994;  Frankenberg,  1995).  Since  government  policy  is
trying  to achieve  some  objective,  the  variation  in fees is not likely  to be random  but rather  reflects
government  policy. In many  cases,  governments  set fees and  locate  facilities  based  on  the
characteristics of the population,  such  as economic  status  and  health  problems.  If the multivariate
analysis  does not  explicitly  account  for the government's  policy  rule  for setting  fees and locations
of facilities,  the estimates  of the  effects  of the  fee on utilization  will be  confounded  with  the effects
of utilization  on government  policy.  2  In addition,  most  of  these studies  have  only  rudimentary
controls  for quality  of care. While  they typically  distinguish  between  levels  (e.g., hospital,  health
center)  and sector  of care (i.e.,  public  or private),  they do not  control  for quality  variation  within
provider  types,  such  as drug availability  and  provider  training.
Three  studies  that are not  subject  to these  criticisms  analyze  the effect  of experimentally
designed  fee increases  on individual  utilization  in experimental  and  control  areas. The first,
Gertler  and  Molynueax  (1997),  estimated  price  elasticities  of demand  for outpatient  services  in
Indonesia  using  longitudinal  panel  data  in which public-sector  user  fees  were varied
experimentally  in 2 of Indonesia's  27 provinces.  The study  design  was integrated  into the local
political  decision-making  authority,  already  in  the process  of developing  user  fee increase  plans.
Rather  than raising  fees everywhere,  fees changes  were  staggered  to generate  price  variation
based  on an explicit  experimental  design. User  fees were  increased  in some  districts  (treatment
areas)  but not  in others  (controls)  and  in both  government  health  and  health  subcenters.
2 For  example,  if fees  are set low  in areas  where  people  have  serious  illness  problems,  the  observed  correlation  between
prices  and utilization  reflects  both  the  fact  that sicker  individuals  use  more  health  care  and  the effect  of price  on
utilization.  Alternatively,  if facilities  are located  closer  to urban  areas  where  individuals  are wealthier,  then  the correlation
between  travel costs  and  utilization  reflects  both  the  relationship  between  income  on utilization  and  the effect  of travel
costs  on utilization.  In both  cases,  the price  elasticity  estimates  are biased,  since  they are  confounded  with other  omitted
factors  related  govemment  policy  choices.
10The estimated  Indonesian  price  elasticities  of demand  are reported  in Table 1. While
price  increase  significantly  lowers  utilization,  the  effect  on children  is greater  than  on adults,  and
the effect  on adults  is greater  than  on the  elderly. The demand  for health  center  care  is more
price  elastic  than  for health  subcenters.  This is not  surprising,  since health  subcenters  serve rural
populations  where  there are  fewer  alternative  (public  or private)  providers  than in urban  areas
where health  centers  tend  to be  located. In fact,  the price  elasticity  of the demand  for health
center  care is close  to unity  whereas  it is well below  one  for subcenters,  suggesting  that  little
revenue  will be mobilized  by raising  health  centers  fees,  but  that a lot  will be mobilized  by raising
subcenter  fees.
Similarly,  Cretin  et al. (1992  and 1996)  reports  results  from a rural  health  insurance  study
in two rural Chinese  countries  in which  copayments,  another  form  of user  fee, were  experimentally
varied  to estimate  price  elasticities  of  demand. During  1989  and  1990,  26 villages  in  two rural
counties  of Sichuan  Province,  China  participated  in an experimental  longitudinal  study  to provide
an analytic  basis  for developing  sound  health  care  financing  mechanisms  in China. The
experiment  assigned  each  village  two different  health  insurance  plans,  one  to operate  in 1989  and
one  in 1990. A total  of eight  different  plans  were  assigned,  with  outpatient  and inpatient
coinsurance  rates  ranging  from 30 percent  to 75 percent. Three  of these  plans  emphasized  the
coverage  of outpatient  care; three  emphasized  the coverage  of inpatient  care;  and  two
represented  a "balanced"  coverage  of outpatient  and  inpatient  care. Although  participation  in the
insurance  plans  was  voluntary,  each household  had  to enroll  as a unit  and participation  rates  were
over  95 percent.
As expected,  for outpatient  services  (used  by about  two-thirds  of the population  each
year), higher  coinsurance  rates  were associated  with significantly  lower  probability  of use  and
significantly  lower  expenditures.  For inpatient  services  (used  by only  3 percent  of the population
each  year), the higher  coinsurance  also  led  to less utilization  and less  expenditures,  although  the
decrease  was not  as strong. The results  suggested  that  the  demand  outpatient  services  is more
price  elastic  than  the demand  for inpatient  services.  Since  more  serious  illnesses  are treated  by
inpatient  hospitalization,  these  results  are consistent  with the hypothesis  that  the demand  for
medical  care is less  price  sensitive  for more  serious  illnesses.  This  is somewhat  reassuring  in
that  it suggests  that reductions  in utilization  from price  increases  are likely  to be  for less  serious
illnesses.
Manning  et al. (1987)  and  Newhouse  (1995)  report  the results  of a large  health  insurance
experiment  (The HIE)  in the United  States  conducted  in the late 1970s. over  20,000  individuals  in
six sites  were randomly  assigned  to one of 14  health  insurance  plans  that had  different  co-
payment  structures.  This experiment  was  different  than  the Indonesian  and Chinese  experiments
in that it used  controlled  random  assignment  of a large  number  of individuals  as its design. While
the  Asian  experiments  were  controlled,  individuals  were  not randomly  assigned. Rather  the
intervention  was at the  community  level. Randomization  at  the individual  level  provides  a better
design  and more  robust  design  (Newman  et al., 1995).
The HIE  was one  of the first scientifically  valid studies  that  convincingly  documented  that
medical  care  individual's  medical  care  utilization  decisions  were influenced  by prices. The results
indicated  that prices  had  more influence  on  the decisions  to initiate  treatment  than  on the  amount
obtained  once  treatment  began. Overall,  the  report  price  elasticities  of about  -0.2 and  the price
elasticity  increases  as the coinsurance  rate increases.  Moreover,  demand  for acute care  and
inpatient  services  were found  to be  less  sensitive  to price  than  chronic  care  and outpatient  care.
This is consistent  with the  Chinese  results,  and  with the hypothesis  that  the demand  for the
treatment  of more severe  illnesses  is less  sensitive  to price.
3.2  The Willingness to Pay for Better Quality and Access.
There  is some  empirical  support  that  individuals  are  willing  to pay at least  a share  of  the
cost of improvements  in access  and  quality,  especially  for drugs  (See  Alderman  and Lavy,  1996
for a review  of  the literature.)  For  example,  a few studies  of cross-sectional  household  data  show
11that individuals  are willing  to pay  at least  some  of  the cost  of improving  access  to medical  care  as
measured  by the  distance  they have  to travel  to reach  the  closest  public  facility  (e.g. Gertler  and
Van der Gaag, 1990;  Lavy  and  Germain,  1994). In addition,  four studies  that  analyze  cross-
sectional  data  find that  a number  of structural  quality  indicators,  especially  drug  availability,
significantly  affected  demand  in Ghana  (Lavy  and  Germain  ,1994),  Nigeria  (Akin,  Guilky  and
Denton,  1995),  Kenya  (Mwabu  and  Ainsworth,  1993),  and  the Philippines  (Hotchkiss,  1993).
The magnitudes  of the estimated  quality  effects  are quite  large.  For  example,  in Ghana,
Lavy  and Germain  (1995)  estimate  that  if the percentage  of public  facilities  with drugs  increased
from its present  66 percent  to 100,  utilization  of public  facilities  would  increase  by nearly  44
percent. Simultaneous  improvements  in drugs,  infrastructure,  and  services  would  increase  the
use of public  facilities  by 127  percent. However,  much  of the increase  in utilization  comes  from
substituting  public  care  for private  care. The same  quality  improvements  that  increase  public
utilization  by 127  percent  only reduce  self-care  by 14  percent. Therefore,  the net effect  on
utilization  is quite  small. However,  users  of public  services  now  have higher  quality  than before.
Since  most  of the  effect  of quality  improvements  is in the choice  among  providers  rather  than
whether  to obtain  treatment,  the net  effect  on health  outcomes  is determined  solely  through  the
increase  in quality  to exiting  public  sector  patients  and not  through  increased  access.
These  studies  all use estimated  parameters  from  demand  models  to calculate  the
willingness  to pay  for the quality  and access  improvements.  Methodologically,  this is equivalent  to
asking  the question,  how  much  would  the  fee have  to increase  to offset  the increase  in utilization
from the improvement  in its quality  or access? 3 Gertler  and  Van  der Gaag  (1990)  found  that given
the geographic  distribution  of individuals  in Peru  and  Cote  d'lvoire,  they are  willing  to pay on
average  about  20 percent  of the cost  of operating  a health  facility  to reduce  the distance  from two
hours  travel  time to zero  to go  to public  health  centers.  However,  the  poor  were willing  to pay
substantially  less  than  the  wealthy. In Ghana,  Lavy  and  Germain  (1994)  found  that  individuals
were  willing  to pay  on average  half  the  cost  of improved  access,  with  the poor  again  willing  to pay
substantially  less. Therefore,  if the  government  asked  consumers  to pay  the "average  willingness
to pay"  for improved  access,  utilization  of  the non-poor  would  increase  while utilization  of the poor
would  decline.
While  these  studies  do demonstrate  a significant  statistical  correlation  between  quality
and utilization,  there  are questions  about  the  direction  of causality  for several  reasons. First,  they
used  cross-sectional  household  data  to investigate  the  effects  of price,  travel  time,  and quality  on
utilization  and  then use  the estimated  models  to simulate  the  effects  of price and  quality  changes
on utilization.  Thus,  they  suffer  from  the same  problem  as the cross-sectional  demand  studies
discussed  earlier: The results  confound  the effects  of prices  and quality  on utilization  with  the
effects  of utilization  on government  geographical  pricing  and  quality  policy.
There  are a number  of longitudinal  studies  that  do not  suffer  from this methodological
problem  of the  cross-sectional  studies. The  first is a field  experiment  in the  Adamaoua  province  of
Cameroon  where Litvack  and  Bodart  (1993)  investigated  the  willingness  to pay for drugs. In a
treatment  area,  facilities  charged  user  fees to finance  a revolving  drug  fund  which increased  drug
availability.  They  found  that utilization  increased  in the  treatment  relative  to utilization  in a control
area. The conclusion  is that the  consumers  in the  treatment  area  were  willing  to pay for the drugs
and, hence,  their  utilization  increased.  Using  a similar  methodology,  Yazbeck  and Leigfhton,
(1995)  investigated  the  effect  the introduction  of  fees to finance  better  quality  prenatal  care in
Niger. They  found  that  prenatal  care  enrollments  in programs  in the  treatment  area increased
relative  to the control  area,  and  that  the increase  was  greater  among  the poor. However,  in an
analysis  without  a control  group,  Haddad  and  Fournier  (1995)  found  that  user  fees led to a fall in
utilization  in Zaire, despite  the fact  that  the drugs  supply  and  the  physical  condition  of the facility
were increased  at  the same  time.
3Strictly  speaking,  the authors  compute  the  compensating  differential  which is  the amount  of income  the individual  would
be willing  to give  up for the  quality  improvement  so that  there  is no change  in welfare.
12A problem  with all of  this work  is the measurement  of quality  itself. Most  of  the studies
use structural  measures  of quality,  such  as the availability  of drugs,  personnel,  physical
infrastructure,  and  equipment.  However,  its not  what  you have-it is what  you do  with it that
matters. Indeed,  several  studies  show  that  process  measures  of quality  are better  predictors  of
health  outcomes  than  structural  measures  (e.g., Peabody  et al., 1995). Moreover,  the most
important  measure,  the availability  of drugs,  confounds  supply  and  demand  effects. Facilities  may
have  shortages  of drugs  because  they are of high  quality  and have  high  utilization  that  depletes
the drug  stocks.
3.3 The Effect Of Fees  On Access  and Health  Outcomes.
The discussion  in section  3.2  through  3.3  focused  on  the budgetary  implications  of
alternative  user  fees policies  in terms  of trying  to measure  the  extent  to which  fee changes  are
able to mobilize  resources  and  the flexibility  in subsidy  allocation.  This analysis  characterizes  the
budgetary  tradeoffs  among  policies.  While  knowing  the  own price  elasticity  of the demand  for
public  facilities  is needed  to forecast  expected  revenues,  it is not sufficient  to evaluate  the impact
on individual  welfare. As a step towards  this,  we review  the empirical  evidence  on the effect  of
prices  and  quality  on access  to medical  care  and  health  outcomes  in this subsection
The first question  regards  the  effect  of price increases  on overall  access. In  other  words,
did the  individuals  who  chose  to no longer  obtain  treatment  at public  facilities  switch  to self-
treatment  or switch  to treatment  from  the private  sector. To measure  the  effect of price  increases
on access,  we examine  the  effect  on the utilization  of all providers,  both  public  and private.
In their  research  in Indonesia,  Gertler  and  Molyneaux  (1996)  examined  effect  of public
health  center  fees on  total visits  including  visits  to all public  and  private  providers.  The  second
row of numbers  in Table  2 reports  the  elasticity  of total  demand  with respect  to an increase  in
public  health  center  fees. The total  demand  price elasticities  are less  than  health  center  demand
price  elasticities,  implying  that  some  individuals  did indeed  switch  to other  providers  as opposed
to self-treatment.  Similarly,  Bennett  (1989)  reports  that after  a fee increase  in Lesotho,  about  half
the reduction  in public  sector  utilization  was  a reallocation  to private  facilities.
Returning  to Indonesia,  in urban  areas,  where  there are more  private  sector  alternatives,
the total  visit elasticity  is about  half  of the health  center  elasticity,  implying  that about  half of the
reduction  in utilization  switched  to other  providers  and  about  half  to self-treatment.  In rural  areas,
the total elasticity  is about  two-thirds  the health  center  elasticity,  implying  a much  larger
percentage  switched  to self-treatment  than in urban  areas. These  results  suggest  that public-
sector  fee  increases  reduce  access  more  in rural  areas  where  there are fewer  private-sector
alternatives.
Table 2:
OWN  AND  TOTAL  PRICE  ELASTICTIES  IN INDONESIA
The % in ...  With a 1% Increase  Children  Adults  Seniors
in Health  Center  Fees  Urban I  Rural  Urban I  Rural  Urban I  Rural
Source: P. Gertler  and  J. Molyneaux  (1997)
Simulating  the effect  of public  fee increases  on public  facility  on total  utilization  also
requires  information  on how  competing  private-sector  providers  respond  to the increased  prices
charged  at government  facilities. When  government  providers  raise  their  prices,  some  patients
may  shift  to the private  sector,  which  may lead  private  providers  to respond  to the demand
13increase  by raising  their  prices. The extent  of  the price response  depends  on  the extent  of the
increase  in demand  and slope  of the private-provider  supply  curve. The larger  the private-sector
price  response,  the  fewer  the number  of people  who  will switch  to the private  sector,  implying  that
more  individuals  will  choose  self-treatment  or remain  in the  public  sector.
Private-sector  price  responses  are likely  to be very  important.  When public  user  fees
were increased  experimentally  in Indonesia,  Gertler  and  Molynueax  (1996)  found  that  while the
fee increases  caused  some  of the individuals  to substitute  self-treatment  for care  at public
facilities,  the increases  caused  others  to turn to the  private  sector  instead. The resulting  increase
in demand  caused  private  doctors  and private  nurse/paramedics  to increase  their  fees in
response  to the increased  demand.
Table  3 reports  the percentage  changes  in private-provider  fees in response  to a 100
percent  increase  in public  health  center  and subcenter  fees. The results  are stratified  by market
type: urban  areas  where  only  health  centers  are available,  semi-urban  areas  where  both  health
centers  and  subcenters  are available  and rural  area  where  only  subcenters  are available.
Table  3:
PRIVATE  PROVIDERS'  PRICE  RESPONSES  TO  PUBLIC-SECTOR  FEES  IN INDONESIA
Urban  Areas:  Health Semi-Urban: Both  Rural  Areas: Health
Center  Only  Center  & Subcenter  Subcenter  Only
Change  In Private  Doctor  Prices  In Response  To  A 100%  Increase  In...
Health  Center  Fees  4.4%  18.4%  --
Health  Subcenter  Fees  --  3.5%  20.1%
Change  In Private  Nurse/Paramedic  Prices  In Response  To  A 100  % Increase  In ...
ealth  Center  Fees  23.8%  9.5%  --
ealth Subcenter  Fees  --  16.7%  57.9%
Source: P. Gertler  and  J. Molyneaux  (1997)
Both private  doctors  and private  nurse/paramedics  increased  their prices  in response  to
the increase  in public-sector  fees. In  general,  the  private-sector  responses  where  greater  in semi-
urban  and rural  areas,  where  there is more  direct  competition  between  the public  and  private
sectors. Similarly,  private  nurses/paramedics,  who are closer  substitutes  to public  primary  care
facilities,  had larger  relative  price  responses  than private  doctors. The price  elasticity  estimates
reported  in Table  2 reflect  both  the  fee increases  in public  sector  and  the consequent  fee
increases  in the private  sector.
These  reductions  in total  utilization  associated  with  the fee increases  can have negative
health  affects.  In the Indonesia  user  fee  experiment,  Gertler  and Molynueax  (1997)  show  that  the
observed  reductions  in utilization  were not  only  for minor  illnesses,  but  for medical  problems  that
measurably  affect  health  status  indicators.  The fee increase  caused  increases  in illness
symptoms  associated  with infectious  diseases  and  the duration  of illness  for all age  groups.  These
results  that an important  channel  by which  prices  hurt health  is by delaying  treatment  to the point
of reducing  the efficacy  of medical  intervention.  An extreme  case  of this may  be in delaying
seeking  help  for emergency  care. In addition,  the fee increases  reduced  older  Indonesians'  (age
50 plus)  ability  to function  physically  as means  by  a series  of  Activity  of Daily  Living  measures  and
increased  days  of restricted  activity  due  to illness. Dow  (et al., 1997)  shows  further  that the
increase  in the fees had  a large  enough  negative  effect  on health  that it reduced  labor  force
participation  among  women.
14In  addition,  there is empirical  evidence  that  suggests  that increases  in access  and  quality
do improve  health  outcomes. In  a cross-sectional  analysis  of household  data,  Benefo  and Schultz
(1994)  found  that child  mortality  was lower  among  families  that lived  closer  to government  health
facilities  in Cote  D'Ivoire  and  in Ghana. They  also  found  that  a doubling  of drug prices  was
associated  with  a 50 percent  increase  in child mortality.  Thomas,  Lavy,  and Strauss  (forthcoming)
found in an analysis  of cross-sectional  data  from Ghana  that improving  drug supplies  significantly
improved  the nutritional  status  of children. In an analysis  of cross-sectional  data  from Jamaica,
Peabody  et al., (1996)  found  that  the birthweight  of babies  was 500  grams  higher  in communities
that offered  better  prenatal  care  services  using  process  measures  of quality.
However,  as with the  cross-sectional  studies  of demand,  one  is not sure  how  much  the
associations  between  health  outcomes  and  quality  of care reflect  the impact  of quality  and  access
on health  outcomes  or the  effect  of outcomes  on the  government  policy  toward  to the
geographical  allocation  of  facilities  and  quality.  One of  the few explicit  attempts  to sort  out  the
direction  of causality  is Frankenberg  (1996)  who used  longitudinal  data  from Indonesia  to show
that  infant  mortality  was lower  in families  located  closer  to public  health  centers.
These  results  suggest  that  there  are real  returns  to public  programs  and  public  subsidies
in terms  of health  outcomes.  Raising  fees thereby  lowering  subsidies  can have  negative  health
consequences.  If governments  choose  to raise  fees,  then,  unless  the freed  subsidies  are
reallocated  to more efficacious  programs,  health  outcomes  may deteriorate.  There  is evidence  to
suggest  that investing  the  subsides  in better  access  and  quality  can improve  health  outcomes.
5. HOW SHOULD  GOVERNMENTS  SET  FEES?
While  the above  analysis  suggests  that governments  may  be able  to mobilize  private
resources  to co-finance  public  programs,  it does not  provide  guidance  on how  to choose  the
optimal  combination  of user  fees  and  allocation  of public  subsidies  across  programs. Optimal
policy  needs  to be based  on what  is best  for furthering  social  objectives  subject  to the  limits
imposed  by medical,  behavioral,  and  economic  constraints.  There  are three  general  groups  of
objectives  often  cited: improving  health  status,  improving  equity  in terms  of access  to medical
care,  and  improving  individuals'  insurance  against  the risk of large  financial  losses  due  to
expected  ill-health  (Hammer  and  Berman,  1996). In  many  cases,  the policy  prescriptions  that
best  further  each  of these  objectives  individually  conflict  with one  another.  Therefore,  because
resources  are constrained,  governments  must  make  trade-offs  in financing  programs  and base
those  decisions  on  the relative  values  it places  on each  of the objectives.
Regardless  of the  objectives  a government  is pursuing  through  its involvement  in the
health  sector,  most  countries  have  limited  public  resources  to invest  in health. In allocating  their
limited  budgets  government  officials  and program  managers  must  use  the resources  wisely  and
get as close  as possible  to their  goals  within  a fixed  budget.  Above,  we considered  the possibility
of charging  user  fees to generate  revenue  generation  to supplement  the public  subsidies  allocated
from general  tax revenues  available  to finance  public  programs.  Here,  we consider  the  joint
problem  of how  to set user  charges  and  allocate  the total budget  (public  subsidies  plus  user  fee
revenues)  while maximizing  government  objectives.  In this section,  we consider  optimal  policy
when  health  outcomes  as  the single  objective  of public  policy  and  discuss  how  the policy  would  be
adjusted  when  equity  and insurance  considerations  are added.
4.1 What Do Prices Do?
One of the key messages  of  this paper  is that level  of fee charged  determines  the degree
to which a particular  program  (or group)  is subsidized. Much  of the user  fee is couched  in terms
of whether  governments  should  raise  fees  closer  to the cost  of providing  the service. To help
guide  optimal  fee policy,  we turn  this question  around  and  ask when  should  government  subsidize
services  so as to lower  prices  bellow  the  cost  of providing  the  service.
15For most  commodities,  there is a certain  "rightness"  about  the level  of use (demand)  when
consumers  face a price  reflecting  the  true resource  cost  of producing  it. People  ask themselves
"is it  worth buying  the  commodity?"  given  all the other  things  they  can do  with their  money.  If the
answer  is yes, then  they  get more  value  out  of it than  it costs  society  to produce  it. If not,  then  they
decide  to spend  their  money  on  something  else  that  they think  is moreworthwhile  for the price.
Individuals  don't purchase  good  or services  whose  prices  exceeds  the  value  the person  places  on
it. Similarly,  if someone  is in a position  to provide  a good  or service,  they  will do so only if the
price  exceeds  the  cost of  their  making  it. So prices  tell both  producers  and  consumers  how  much
something  really  costs  to produce  and how  much  people  really  value  it.
Several  examples  of the  way prices  can help  guide resources  efficiently  in the health
sector  follow. People  often  bypass  lower  level  clinics  to go  to hospitals  even  when  the clinic  could
have  handled  their  problem  because  they  will get  better  care  at the hospital  and  if they are both
free, or have  the same  price,  why not? If prices  reflected  the cost  of  the service,  then hospital
prices  would  be higher  than  clinic  prices  and  only  those  who  valued  the hospital  service  more  than
its unit  cost  would  bypass  the  clinic.  A second  example  is to limit  use of services  if people  do not
think  their health  problem  is not  serious  enough  to be  worth  the  trouble  and cost  of seeking  help.
Seeking  help  takes  up real  resources  in terms  of the  time of  trained  professionals  as well as
increasing  congestion  and  waiting  time for others. If prices  are less  than  the cost  of providing
treatment,  then  treating  minor  problems  whose  value  is less  than  the  cost is inefficient.  The main
point  is that  prices  serve  to make  people's  choices  efficient-putting resources  where  they are
most  valuable  to them.
What's  wrong  with  this picture? For  any of several  market  failure  reasons 4 the amount
demanded,  or the value  placed  on goods  may  not  be "right".  The value  to society  for seeking  care
or providing  a service  may  be higher  than  that privately  judged by  the individual.  If this is the
case,  then  society  benefits  if more  people  use  the service  more  than  would  based  on individuals'
private  benefits  and  this  justifies  public  subsidies  to lower  the price. How much  of a subsidy
depends  on  the degree  to which  the  social  value  exceeds  the private  value. How much  benefit
can be improved  with subsidies  also  depends  on how  responsive  to prices  consumers  are. The
more price  elastic  the demand,  the greater  the social benefit  from a given  subsidy.
Allocating  government  subsidies,  as with government  intervention  in any sector,  needs  to
be justified  in terms  of the benefit  the investment  would  have  for society  above  and beyond  what
would  have  happened  without  public  intervention.  The  way  to assess  the benefit  of a proposed
public  intervention  is to identify  the  failures  of private  markets  and  quantify  the loss from  these
failures.  Priorities  should  be based  on the  degree  to which  the subsidy  ameliorates  these  losses,
and  the importance  governments  place  on the  types  of losses  and  the individuals  who incur  the
losses. Important  market  failures  in the health  sector  that  justify public  subsidy  are public  goods,
inequity  in access  to medical  care,  and insurance  market  failure  due  to asymmetric  information.
4.2 Improving Health Status.
In most  countries,  Ministries  of Health  try to improve  health  through  spending  on public
health  activities  and  delivering  health  care  services  in public  health  centers  and  hospitals.  This is
why policy-makers  become  concerned  when  fee increases  lead  to big reductions  in utilizations.
One  of the major  policy  levers  by  which MOH  can improve  health  status  is to encourage
or discourage  utilization  by the  way it sets  the price  of health  care  services.  MOH  may  want to
stratify  its price  subsidies  to encourage  utilization  of specific  services  (e.g., immunizations,
4  As will be argued below, which of these several reasons matters in the design of the appropriate policy.
S However, it is interesting to note that this runs counter to an economic notion of welfare.  A fee (price) rise hurts all
consumers though it helps all producers. The amount of harm to the individual is proportional to the amount they
consume.  If individuals are able to find other goods and services that are close substitutes, then they can mitigate
welfare loss from the price rise by moving reducing consumption of the now higher and increasing consumption of close
substitutes.  This  implies  that fee  increases  have  lower  welfare  effects  when  demand  is price  elastic.
16prenatal  care)  and by specific  groups  (e.g.,  the poor). However,  not  all increases  in utilization  are
from new  utilization.  Some  may  be substitution  for private-sector  services  (or  other less public
services)  that have  been  substituted  for by the subsidized  public  services. The degree  to which
the increased  utilization  improves  health  depends  on  the efficacy  of the  additional  health  care
consumed. By additional  care  consumed,  we have  to subtract  any reduction  in private-sector
services  for which  the individual  would  have  purchased  had  there  been  no subsidy.
However,  the MOH  does not  have  unlimited  public  resources  with which  to spend  on its
various  activities.  The MOH  has  a fixed  budget  which  it can relax  only  by charging  fees  for its
services.  While  price  increases  may  generate  substantial  revenues,  they also  deter  individuals
from seeking  care  who  might  have  sought  the treatment  when  it was priced  lower.
In  order  to translate  this discussion  into a set of policy  rules,  we need  to establish  the  link
between  policy  levers  and  objectives  of policy. Therefore,  since  MOH's  objective  function  is in
terms  of health  and its policy  levers  are in terms  of prices  which determine  both  the level  of private
resources  and  the allocation  of public  subsidies,  we need  to establish  the linkages  between  health
and  prices. By altering  prices,  governments  affect  the utilization  of medical  care  and  the amount
of money  spent  on public  health  activities. Utilization  of medical  care  and public  health  programs
influence  health  outcomes.
With improved  health  as the objective  and  the links between  policy  and  objectives
established,  we are able  to identify  four pricing  principles  that need  to be balanced  for the
govemment  to get the  most health  out  of its available  budget  for subsidies. 6
1.  Subsidies  should  be  higher  for those  services  where  public  care  is better  than  private-
i.e. for those  services  that  yield  the best  health  outcomes  compared  to peoples'
alternative  source. If the  alternative  to public  care is a traditional  healer  of dubious
quality,  fees should  be  raised  with great  caution. If the alternative  is a reasonable
private  sector  (in Indonesia,  the private  sector  consists  of public  providers  in their
afternoon  hours),  then  fees may  make  more  sense.  Obviously,  if health  is the
objective,  then  it is better  to encourage  the use of  the most  productive  services  through
subsidized  prices.
2.  Subsidies  should  be higher  for those  services  for which  total (public  and  private)
demand  is most  elastic  with respect  to fees in public  facilities.  Governments  cannot
mandate  the use of health  care. They  can  only  provide  incentives  for use. Subsidies
encourage  use  of a service  by  lowering  the price. The more  price  elastic  is demand,
the larger  the increase  in utilization  from  a given  price  subsidy. However,  demand  may
be more price  elastic  for less  efficacious  services. Therefore,  the subsidies  should  be
higher  for those  services  which produce  the  most  health. These  services  are most
successful  in producing  the most  health  because  of the combination  of efficacy  and  of
the volume  of patients  generated  by the introduction  of the subsidy.
3.  Subsidies  should  be higher  for those  individuals  whose  demand  is more  price  elastic.
For similar  reasons  as in (2),  subsidies  produce  more  health  for groups  of individuals  for
whom  the subsidy  is more  likely  to encourage  use.  This implies  that subsidies  should  be
higher  to poor  individuals  whose  demand  is more price  elastic. An interesting
implication  of this pricing  principle  is that it is optimal  to lower  prices  to the poor  even if
the government  is not concerned  with equity  nor  with welfare  but  is concerned  with
health  status  per se.
4.  Subsidies  should  be higher  for those  services  and  in those  areas  where  there  are
limitedprivate  sectoralternatives  (competftion).  Subsidies  will produce  substantially
less  health  if they only  cause  individuals  to substitute  out of the  private  sector  into  the
public  sector. The most health  will be produced  when  subsidies  encourage  new
6 See  Hammer  (1996)  and  Gertler  and  Hammer  (1996)  for  formal  derivation  and  detailed  of  the  pricing  rules.
17utilization  so that  illnesses  that  would  not otherwise  have  been  treated  are now  treated.
This implies  that  certain  types  of preventive  services  and health  care  services  in rural
areas  should  be  more  heavily  subsidized  because  there  are fewer private  sector
alternatives.
The first three principles  argue  that  setting  prices  for services  or for particular  groups
must  balance  two competing  needs:  (1)  limiting  the adverse  health  effect  from a reduction  in
utilization,  and  (2) mobilizing  resources  that  can be used  to subsidize  other  activities  or groups
and  provide  more  services.  Services  or groups  for which prices  discourage  large  numbers  of
individuals  from  getting  treatment  (price  elastic)  should  have lower  prices. Conversely,  when
demand  is more price  inelastic,  higher  prices  mobilize  more  revenue  that can be used  to cross-
subsidize  other  beneficial  activities  and  affect  health  status  less. The basic  idea  in setting  prices
is to push  the public  subsidies  as far as it can go in achieving  health  gains. This implies  that price
subsidies  need  to be  assessed  in terms  of  their  effect  on health  outcomes  and  their impact  on the
budget,  rather  than  relative  to the resource  costs  of service  delivery.
The first and last principle  point  out  that  the interaction  between  the public  and private
sectors  is critical  in setting  prices.  If the private  sector  offers  comparable  quality  services  and
individuals  are willing  to pay the  private  sector  price,  then  the  government  subsidies  will not
improve  health. All they  will do is cause  individuals  to substitute  public-sector  care  for private-
sector  care. In this case,  MOH  should  not provide  the care  or at least  price  the services  so that
few subsidies  are absorbed.  This is clearly  the  case  for VIP rooms  in hospitals  since  the only
group that  uses  VIP rooms  are  the wealthy  and  these  services  are usually  available  in the private
sector.
When  the public  sector  lowers  its prices  because  of subsidies  and  draws  patients  away
from the private  sector,  it is in essence  competing  with  the private  sector. The availability  of
subsidies  to public-sector  providers  lowers  the profitability  of private-sector  providers. Public
subsidies  affect  the prices  that  the private  sector  can  charge  and raise  speculation  on  whether  it is
profitable  to locate  in the same  area. The  fact that  there  are no  private  providers  in an area is not
necessarily  an indication  that  the  area  would  not be served  by private  providers  if there  were no
public  services  available. It is only  a statement  that  the private  sector  does not  currently  find the
area profitable.  As the public  sector  raises  its prices,  however,  the competitive  constraints  on the
private  sector  are eased. As a result,  we may  see  the private  sector  raise its prices  and possibly
new  private  sector  entry  into  the market. These  supply  responses  will affect  the demand  for
public-  and private-sector  services  and,  therefore,  affect  health  outcomes  and resource
mobilization.  Therefore,  these  supply  responses  need  to be  factored  into  the setting  of public
sector  prices.
One clear message  is that  the  government  should  subsidize  services  that the  private
sector  is unlikely  to provide. The most  obvious  candidates  are public  goods. A pure public  good
is one  for which  a private  market  cannot  exist  at all because  beneficiaries  cannot  be made  to pay
for benefits  (non-excludable)  and  one  person's  benefits  are  not reduced  by others'  benefiting  as
well (non-rivalrous).  In  the health  sector,  the best  examples  would  be some  forms  of vector
control  (e.g. draining  swamps),  some  forms  of sanitation,  especially  in urban  areas  and  the
provision  of health  information  and education  for activities  such  as washing  hands  which have no
product  associated  with them  which advertising  would  promote.  Research,  epidemiological
surveillance  and  monitoring  food  and  drug  safety  are other examples.  A health  service  has a
positive  etemality  if its use  generates  benefits  to society  above  and beyond  the benefit  to the
private  individual.  The most  common  etemality  in the health  sector  comes  from prevention  and
the  treatment  of infectious  diseases.  For  example,  in The Gambia,  the use of pesticide-treated
bed-nets  reduced  the incidence  of malaria  even  among  those  who  do not use such  bed-nets
suggesting  that  the  societal  benefit  from bed-nets  was greater  than the  private  benefits  (Tropical
Disease  Research  Program,  1995).
18Left  to their  own  devices,  individuals  will prevent  and  treat infectious  diseases  less  than  is
socially  optimal.  Many  individuals  are not  willing  to pay  the full cost  of immunization  because  they
know  that  they  will be protected  if enough  other  people  get immunized. 7 Even  with worthwhile
medical  benefits  to individuals,  the  cost  may  impede  seeking  treatment  soon enough  to prevent
the  spread  to other individuals  or from completing  the  full course  of treatment.  The consequence
of not  completing  drug  therapies  may not  only  lead  to a resurgence  of the  disease,  but also  to an
increase  transmission  and the  risk of promoting  resistance  to known  drug  therapies.  For  example,
tuberculosis  is a virulent,  communicable  disease,  and  although  the drug therapy  is both  available
and  effective,  it is expensive.  Individuals  feel better  after partial  treatment  and tend  to  want  to
stop  treatment  long before  the course  of drugs  is completed.  They remain  a public  hazard  as they
can still  transmit  the  disease.
To get individuals  to obtain  the proper  levels  of prevention  and  treatment,  the  government
needs  to use public  subsidies  to lower  the price  of these  services  so as to encourage  utilization.  In
some  cases,  the  government  must  fully  subsidize  the activities.
Some  countries  so indeed  fully  subsidize  the prevention  and  treatment  of communicable
diseases. For  example,  Creese  and  Kutzin  report  that Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Jamaica,  Mali,  Niger,
PNG,  and  Zimbabwe  do not  charge  for the  treatment  of  tuberculosis.  And  all of these  countries,
except  PNG,  do not  charge  for the  treatment  of STDs. There  is evidence  that  subsidizing  the use
of public  good  programs  leads  to improvements  in utilization.  In  Zambia  and  China,  child
immunization  rate  fell dramatically  after  the introduction  of user  fees (Booth  et al., 1995;  Sheng-
Lan  et al., 1994).
Taiwan,  China  provides  an example  of huge  increase  in health  status  indicators  through
public  health  investments  while  at style  at low levels  of income. In  the 1950s  Taiwan,  China  was
faced  with  extreme  poverty  with a per capita  income  of below  $150  in today's  terms. Associated
with this low living  standard  were widespread  incidences  of infectious  and  parasitic  diseases. In
1952,  the major  causes  of death  were gastritis,  duodententis,  enteritis,  clotitis,  pneumonia  and
tuberculosis.  About 1.2  out  of a population  of 7.8  million  were infected  with  Malaria. In 1962,  383
cases  of Cholera  were reported. Approximately  90 of  the population  were infected  with hepatitis  B
by age  40, and  around  15  to 20 percent  were hepatitis  B carriers.  The infant  mortality  rate  was
about  45 per  thousand  live births  and  a matemal  mortality  rate of about  197  per 100,000  live
births. The Government  reacted  to these problems  with  extensive  public  health  improvements  in
water  supply  and  sanitation,  disease  control  programs,  and immunization  campaigns.  Free
vaccinations  against  the major  infectious  diseases  were made  available  to infants  and  preschool
children.  In order  to expand  immunization,  health  education  and  treatment,  the  govemment  also
setup primary  care  facilities  throughout  the country.
These  efforts  in combination  with improving  living  conditions  were able  to control
infectious  diseases  by the mid-1960s.  There  have  been  no  cases  of smallpox  or rabies  since
1959. In 1965,  Taiwan,  China  was declared  Malaria  free by WHO.  By 1970,  Taiwan,  China  had
achieved  health  status  close  to that in most  developed  countries  today. Life expectancy
increased  from 55  years  in 1951  to 69 years  in 1970. Neonatal  mortality  fell by more  than half
between  1955  and 1970.  Infant  mortality  decreased  by about  two-thirds  over  the same  period,
and maternal  mortality  had  similar  improvements.  It is critical  to note  that these  successes  were
achieved  at very low income  levels. In 1970,  real  per capita  income  in 1993  dollars  was $389
which would  place  1970  Taiwan,  China  among  the poorer  countries  in today's  world.
7 Transmission  of an infectious  disease  is affected  mostly  by  the number  who  are immunized.  Individual  immunization
thereby  confers  benefit  to those  who are  not immunized
19Table  4: Health  Status  in Taiwan,  China,  1950  to 1993
1955  --  61  18  45  159
1960  $ 158  64  15  35  106
1965  $218  67  9  24  75
1970  $ 389  69  7  17  40
1975  $ 987  71  5  13  25
1980  $ 2348  72  3  10  19
1985  $ 3,247  73  2  7  10
1990  $ 7,916  74  2  5  12
1993  $ 11,464  75  2  5  9
Source:  Health  and  Vital  Statistics  I and  11,  Department  of Health,  Taipei.
A second  clear  message  is that  governments  should  not  expand  resources  where  a
market  exists  and  is functioning  well. If the private  sector  provides  an acceptable  and  affordable
alternative  to a public  service,  there is little  justification  for the public  sector  to be involved  in
subsidizing  that specific  service. This  situation  is most  likely  to exist  in the market  for outpatient
services  and  drugs  for treating  non-communicable  diseases. In  this case,  the benefits  of
treatment  accrue  mostly  to the individual  and  therefore  there  should  be a private  market  for these
services. Moreover,  this is a justification  to shift  more  subsidies  to rural areas  where  there are
fewer private  alternatives.
A possible  role  for government  in the market  for individual  (non-public  good) health  care
services  such  as curative  care is that  case  where  private  providers  have  market  power  to set
prices  above  marginal  (incremental  unit)  costs  such  as in the  case  of monopoly 8. When  private
prices  are above  marginal  costs,  utilization  is lower  than  would  be  warranted  by  the cost  of
providing  the service  and  there is (deadweight)  loss  in economic  efficiency.  In this case  the
govemment  could  either  try to regulate  private  sector  prices  or directly  provide  them  through  the
public  sector  priced  at  cost.
A third  message  is that prices  should  be  used  to direct  individuals  to the most  efficient
treatment  location. Illnesses  and  prevention  activities  that  can be  efficiently  treated  at cheaper
health  clinics  should  not  be treated  at hospitals. Because  the demand  for the treatment  of more
serious  illnesses  is less price  elastic,  increasing  the price  of hospital  care  relative  to health  center
care  will induce  individuals  with  less  serious  illnesses  to not  bypass  health  centers  in  favor of
hospitals.  Such  cascading  systems  of charges  do  exist  in a number  of countries  including  Kenya,
Indonesia,  Namibia,  Zambia,  and  Zimbabwe  (Barnum  and  Kutzin,  1993;  WHO, 1994). Criel  and
Van Balen  (1993)  reported  that  these  prices  structure  did indeed  move  individuals  out of hospitals
into health  centers  in Zaire. However,  in Zambia  and  Zimbabwe,  hospitals  are still overcrowded
and  health  centers  still underutilized.  This  implies  that either  the price  differential  is too low  or that
there  are few services  of real  value  provided  at  the health  centers-i.e. the  centers  have no  drugs
and  few qualified  medical  personnel.  In the later  case,  the  quality  adjusted  price  differential  is too
low  and, in any event,  there is no  health  benefit  of sending  individual  to health  centers. This
would  require  improvements  in quality  to justify keeping  health  centers  open.
a  Another  reason  for government  to intervene  in the  market  for individual  health  care  services  arises  when  the private
provider  has  more  information  about  the  patient's  illness  than  the patient  and  the  provider  is not  a perfect  agent  for the
patient. By perfect  agent,  we mean  that the  provider  cares  about  more  things  than  the  patient's  health. In this case,  the
provider  could  induce  the patient  to buy  more  services  than  he or she  might  otherwise  buy.
20A fourth  message  is that governments  should  not  use  across  the board  consultation  fees
that are the  same  for each  diagnosis  and demographic  group. The prevention  and  treatment  of
illnesses  that have  large  public  health  externalities  and  for which  demand  is most  elastic  should
have  lower  fees-i.e.  higher  subsidies.  Across  the board  fee increases  in Kenya  led  to a
reduction  in the treatment  of STDs  by about  40 percent  and  similar  results  were  found  in Zambia
(WHO,  1994). Similarly,  across  the board  fee increases  led  to reductions  in child immunizations
in China  (Sheng-Lan  et a., 1994)  and  in Swaziland  (Yoder,  1989).  Also,  there is strong
econometric  evidence  that  children's  demand  for medical  care is more  price  sensitive.  This in
addition  to the importance  of prevention  and  treatment  early in life suggest  that  higher  subsidies
should  go to young  children. A similar  price  elasticity  argument  can be  made  for directing  more
subsidies  to the  poor. However,  charging  the poor  a lower  fee  is administratively  a difficult
problem  to address  somewhat  in  the next  sub-section.
4.3 Adjusting  Policy  to Improve  Equity.
Most  countries  recognize  that poor  individuals  may not  be  able to afford  health  care  and
therefore  subsidize  their  access  to care.  In countries  where health  care  is delivered  through  public
delivery  systems,  subsidies  are used  to keep  user  charges  low so  that even  the poorest  families
can afford  medical  care.  Support  for this use of public  subsidies  are often  based  on the idea  that
nobody,  regardless  of income,  should  be denied  access  to basic  minimal  health  care. While  these
commitments  are not  boundless,  they  are pervasive  throughout  the  world.  This  has important
implications  in that  redistribution  policies  are inseparable  part  of health  care  policy. Unless  private
health  care  and  insurance  markets  are able  to guarantee  universal  access,  governments  will
intervene  and subsidize  certain  services  and groups  to varying  extents.
Before  we begin,  it is important  to emphasize  that  the health  sector  is not  a good  vehicle
for general  poverty  alleviation. Studies  of the  demand  for medical  care  show  it to be  an income
elastic  good  (e.g.  Gertler  and  Van der Gaag,  1990;  Baker  and  Van  der Gaag,  1995)3.  This means
that  the rich spend  a higher  fraction  of their  income  on health  care  than  do the poor. Therefore
medical  care  subsidies  accrue  more  to the rich  more  than  the poor. There  are other  goods  which
are more income  inelastic  (e.g.  food)  that  would  be better  vehicles  for general  poverty  alleviation.
Much  of the  concern  over user  fees is based  on the concern  that  increasing  fees may
reduce  utilization  by the poor-a  reasonable  concem  given  the strong  empirical  evidence  that  the
poor's  demand  for medical  care  is more  price  elastic  discussed  in section  3.1. Moreover,  this
extents  to the case  where  fees  are used  to generate  revenues  that finance  improvements  in the
quality  of and  access  to curative  care. The  extent  to  which this policy  improves  welfare  depends
on how  willing  individuals  are to pay  for the quality  and  access  improvements.  If individuals  are
willing  to pay  the full cost  of the improvement,  then  the improvements  can be fully  financed
through  increased  user  fees  without  reductions  in utilization.  However,  if the  wealthy  are willing  to
pay  but the poor  are not,  then  this policy  could  lead  to a reallocation  of public  subsidies  from the
poor  to the  wealthy. Thus,  equity  proponents  are concerned  that  increased  user  fees  would
become  a financial  barrier  to the poor  and reduce  their  access  to care  (e.g. Cornia,  Jolly and
Stewart,  1987;  Gilson,  1990). In  this case,  there  is a tradeoff  between  using  subsidies  to pursue
equitable  access  to medical  care  and  overall  improvements  in health.
Under  the current  situation  needs  to be  remedied  because  most  of the curative  public
expenditures  go to the care  of the  non-poor. Moreover,  the  poor actually  pay higher  prices  than
the  non-poor  when  transport  and  other  time costs  are  taken into  account. This is because  the
current  geographic  distribution  of public  facilities  implies  that  the poor  must  travel significantly
further  than  the non-poor. These  higher  prices  are in part responsible  for the poor  having  low
utilization  rates  and  obtaining  only  a small  share  of public  subsidies.
9  The best candidates for redistribution via subsidies are goods and services that have low or negative income elasticities
of demand-i.e.  those goods and services whose use does not increase with income.  These are the things that poor
people tend to consume relatively more than other things.
21In  this section,  we consider  pricing  policy  in the context  of  the government  expanding  its
objectives  beyond  health  to iniclude  equity  concerns  in its objectives  for pricing  policy. We begin
with  the common  approach  of using  across  the  board  subsidies,  which  are used  by many
countries,  and  then  move  to price  discrimination  strategies  that  try to exempt  the poor  from paying
fees.
Across the Board Subsidies. Many  governments  try  to promote  equity  through
subsidizing  the  public  health  care  system.  Because  low income  countries  have trouble
implementing  means  of  testing  (i.e.  identifying  the poor individually  by  examining  their  financial
resources),  they keep  fees low  for everyone.  This amounts  to across  the board  subsidies  from
the  average  taxpayer  to the  average  user  of health  facilities.  If the average  user  is poorer  than  the
average  tax payer  then  there  is a net redistribution  of income.
However,  many  countries  allocate  most  of  their public  subsidies  to the services  used  least
by the poor-i.e.  hospital  services.  These  services  are expensive  and  are rationed  by prices,
travel  time, and  social  status  rather  than  by clinical  need.  As a result,  public  subsidies  tend to
benefit  the  wealthy  more  than  the poor. Governments  can  better  target  subsidies  to the  poor by
more  heavily  subsidize  services  used  by the poor.
Indonesia  is typical  of countries  that  try to subsidize  the poor's  access  to medical  care
through  low-fee  public  health  care  systems. Figure  1 presents  the  percentage  of public  subsidies
that accrue  to families  in each  income  quintiles. The subsidies  are calculated  as number  of visits
made  to each public  facility  times  the subsidy  (unit  cost  less  the user  fee). The wealthiest  quintile
captures  about  29 percent  of total government  health  care  subsidies,  whereas  the poorest  quintile
obtains  only  about  12  percent  of total  subsidies.  This is in part due  to the  fact that  wealthy  use
hospital  services  in much  greater  rates  than  the poor. One reason  for this is that hospitals  tend to
be  located  in urban  areas  closer  to the  wealthy  and  far from  the rural poor. That the  wealthy
capture  more  subsidies  is not  only  due  to the  fact that  they have  much  higher  utilization  of hospital
inpatient  and  outpatient  services  than  do  the poor,  but also  that hospital  services  are subsidized  at
much  higher  levels  than  are health  center  and  health  subcenter  servicesio.
A similar  story  is told  for Viet Nam  (World  Bank,  1995). The allocation  of public  subsidies
increases  with income. The overall  results  is driven  by the  fact that the  wealthy  capture  a much
greater  share  of both  hospital  inpatient  and  outpatient  subsidies.  This is because  they use hospital
services  more  and hospital  services  receive  the  highest  unit  subsidies.  While  the poor use
commune  health  centers  at much  greater  rates  than  the non-poor,  this has  little impact  on  the
benefit-incidence  distribution  because  the public  subsidies  to commune  health  centers  makeup  a
very small  portion  of total  public  expenditures.
With across  the board  subsidies,  a major  cost  of subsidizing  the poor  is the subsidies  that
leak  to the non-poor.  The greater  the  income  elasticity  of demand,  the higher  is this cost  of
targeting. Jamaica,  like in Indonesia  and  Viet Nam,  heavily  subsidizes  hospital  care. In order  to
target one  dollar  to the poor,  the govemment  must  give  the  non-poor  about  $3.25  in subsidies
(Gertler  and Sturm,  1997). Similarly,  Van der Gaag  (1995)  shows  that  while expousing  equity  as
a goal,  countries  such  as China,  Cote  d'lvoire,  Peru  and  Tanzania  also  provide  higher  subsidies  to
services  used by the  wealthy. Solon  (1991)  shows  that high  income  individuals  in the Philippines
receive  much  more  in public  health  care benefits  than  they pay in taxes.
10  In fact, the subsidies were Rp. 206,000 for a hospital inpatient visit, Rp. 8,100 for a hospital outpatient visit, Rp. 3,400
for a health center visit, and Rp. 2,200 for a health subcenter visit (World bank, 1  993a).  In contrast, subsidies through
health center and subcenter facilities are much more equitably distributed, because utilization rates of these facilities are
more evenly distributed across income groups.
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Price Discrimination.  The extent  to which  the government  is able  to price discriminate
and only  raise  fees  that  the non-poor  pay,  mitigates  the  severity  of this health-equity  tradeoff  i.
To improve  equity,  the  govemment  needs  to develop  practical  policies  that lower  the price  paid by
the poor relative  to that paid  by the non-poor  by even  more  than is indicated  by the  optimal  pricing
policies  developed  in the last section. There  are a number  of ways  to do this
How  well the  government  is able  to implement  a pricing  policy  that maximally  improves
health  and  redistributes  subsidies  towards  the poor  depends  on its ability  to identify  the  poor in
order  to price  discriminate  and  target  programs.  Here,  we consider  four common  types  of
targeting  (individual  means  testing,  geographic,  self-selection,  and  indicator  targeting). The
targeting  effectiveness  of criteria:
*  Type I error  Failing  to exempt  someone  who should  be  exempted.  The  greater  the  type I
error,  the  fewer the number  of poor  protected  by the  price  discrimination  method.  An extreme
example  of type I error  would  be if facilities  charged  everyone  the  full cost of  delivering  the
service. In this case,  type I error  would be 100  percent.
*  Type 11  error  Exempting  someone  who  should  not be  exempted  from paying  the  fee. The
greater  the  type 11  error,  the greater  the leakage  of potential  revenues  from  the non-poor  and
As  discussed  in  the  last  section,  even  if the  government  is  not  concerned  with  equity,  there  are  still  good  reasons
related  to  the  desire  to improve  health  to  price  discriminate  in  favor  of  the  poor.
23the lower  the subsidies  that reach  the poor. An extreme  example  of type II error  would  be if
everyone  were  given  free  care. In  this case,  all potential  revenues  would be  lost and type 11
error  would  be 100  percent.
*  Administrative  costs: The costs  of identifying  the poor  and implementing  price  discrimination
can swamp  all of  the gains  from price  discrimination.  There  are clearly  diminishing  returns  to
making  price  discrimination  methods  more  precise.  Administrative  methods  vary from
inexpensive  procedures  such  as geographic  price  discrimination  and targeting  by age and
gender  to costly  procedures  such  as a sliding  fee  system  with social  worker  verification. The
additional  benefits  of better  targeting  methods  need  to be  compared  to the additional
administrative  costs  of implementing  them.
Individual price discrimination based  on means  testing  is the  ideal  method  for
minimizing  the revenue  loss  from protecting  the  poor. However,  administrative  costs  and  past
practical  experience  make  it ineffective  in most  countries.  For  example,  in both Indonesia  and  Viet
Nam's  the poor  can get  the fee  waved  through  an affidavit  of indigence.  Financially  indigent
persons  can request  that  their local  headman  to issue  an affidavit  which  exempts  them  from
paying  fees for health  services  at all public  health  facilities  and  schools. However,  few people
seem  to take  advantage  of the  opportunity  (World  Bank,  1995  and 1996). It is not  clear  why the
systems  are failing. Several  possibilities  exist: people  may  just not  know  about  the benefit;  prices
are so low  that  the benefit  is not  worth  the opportunity  cost  of obtaining  it; local  officials  may  be
charging  a fee to issue  the  affidavit;  facilities  may  charge  a fee  to accept  the affidavit;  and  there
may be a social  stigma  associated  with  using  it.
The problem  is how  economic  well-being  can be measured  in  an economy  where the
majority  of the population  pays  no income  tax and  where  a good  portion  of economic  resources
are home  produced.  Without  accurate,  fast and  administratively  simple  methods  of identifying
poor individuals,  an individual  exemption  mechanism  may  exempt  too many people  and
consequently  sacrifice  substantial  revenues.  More  importantly,  identifying  the poor  when  they
come  from treatment  is costly  and  extremely  difficult  to do. It is certainly  beyond  the  ability of
health  sectors  to do  so, and is not  practical  method  outside  the context  of a general  government-
wide means  testing  program. The general  consensus  in the literature  is that  facility  based
individual  exemption  programs  in the health  sector  are too  costly,  very difficult  to administer,  and
typically  are not  good  at identifying  the poor  across  all regions  of the  developing  world  (e.g. Booth
et al., 1995;  Chaulagai,  1995;  Ensor  and  San,  1995;  McPike  et al., 1991; Mwabu  et al., 1995;
Nolan  and  Tubat; Richardson,  1992;  Stinson,  1982;  and  Vogel,  1988).
An alternative  method  of implementing  a pricing  policy  which  protects  the poor is
geographic targeting. This policy  aims  to tailor  the  fee structure  to the socioeconomic
composition  of the population  served  by each  facility. The first issue  is that if the poor live in more
rural than  in urban  areas  and  facilities  are located  more in urban  areas  than in rural  areas,  then
poor  face higher  access  costs  than  the non-poor  with uniform  fees. The  first principle  of
geographic  targeting  is to locate  more  facilities  closer  to where  the poor  live. Otherwise,  the  fees
at facilities  that serve  the  poor must  be lower  in order  to compensate  for the higher  time costs  so
that  the price  of access  is the same  for poor  and non-poor.
With this in mind,  facilities  that  serve  primarily  poor households  would  charge  zero  or
near-zero  fees,  and  facilities  that  serve primarily  non-poor  households  would  charge  larger  fees.
The  fee charged  by a facility  would  rise  with the  average  economic  status  of the households  in its
service  region. Indeed,  facilities  in  wealthier  areas  could  charge  fees equal  to or in excess  of unit
costs. A facility-level  fee schedule  increasing  with  the  economic  status  of the households  in the
facility's  service  region  would  imply  that government  subsidies  are pro-poor  in that  they are largest
in the poorest  areas.
While  in principle  the idea  of geographic  price  discrimination  is straightforward,  its
implementation  is quite  complex.  Populations  within a region  will not  be homogeneous.  Every
24region  will have  some  households  whose  income  is below  the  govemment's  definition  of poverty.
In  those regions  where  a large  percentage  of the  population  are poor,  the  government  can keep
fees low enough  to protect  the majority  of  the poor  without  experiencing  high  levels  of  Type II
error. However,  in regions  with  a low percentage  of poor,  the  government  would  have  to choose
between  forgoing  substantial  revenues  from those  able to pay in order  to protect  a small  number
of poor, or failing  to protect  the poor in order  to reduce  revenue  loss  from  the non-poor. In  this
case,  it would  be cost-effective  to screen  the poor  at the  facilities  or employ  an individual
discrimination  method.
Using  geographic  price  discrimination  in rural  areas  where  the poor  are concentrated  is a
promising  method  to protect  the  poor  without  a large  sacrifice  of revenues.  Long  travel  times
prevent  people  living  in wealthier  areas  from  switching  to the lower  fee facilities  in poorer  areas
once  fees in the  more  affluent  areas  have  been  increased.  However,  the method  has limited
potential  in urban  areas  where  the poor  are intermixed  with  the non-poor  and most  facilities  are
easily  accessed  by both  poor  and  non-poor.
Differential  Pricing  by Level  of Service  and Self-selection.  An alternative  approach  to
protect  the poor  in urban  areas  is through  differential  pricing  by level  of service.  The notion  is to
have  low  subsidies  for services  valued  and  used  more by  the non-poor,  and high  subsidies  for
services  used mostly  by the poor. These  are  the services  for which  demand  is income  inelastic.
One  method  is to shift  subsidies  to the prevention  and  treatment  of infectious  diseases.
Since  the poor  tend  to suffer  proportionally  more  from infectious  diseases,  subsidizing  their
treatment  and  prevention  not  only  meets  public  health  objectives  but  also improves  the distribution
of public  subsidies  across  income  groups. For  example,  Table  4 shows  the distribution  of
mortality  by different  causes  across  different  income  groups  among  adult  women  in China. While
poorer  women  have higher  mortality  rates  from all causes, the  poor die  from infectious  diseases
proportionately  more  than do  other income  groups. The ratio  of the  poor  who die from infectious
diseases  relative  to the rich is 3.5,  while  the ratio  of poor  to rich  who  die from non-communicable
diseases  is only 1.3. Basic  principles  of targeting  (Besley  and  Kanbur,  1989)  suggest  that, if the
costs  of treatment  are the  same,  then  reallocation  subsidies  from non-communicable  diseases  to
the prevention  and  treatment  of communicable  disease  would  better  target  public  subsidies  to the
poor.
Table  4: Female  Adult Mortality  Rates  Per 100  By Cause  of Death  and Income  in China
incomerQuartile  --  Infectlous  ::-  n-dmcommu  icabl-  Injuries
Richest  .4  6.7  1.2
2  .4  7.9  2.0
3  .6  7.6  2.4
Poorest  1.4  8.9  2.7
Source:  Adapted  from Murray  et al (1992)
As a general  rule,  the government  should  subsidize  services  for which demand  is income
inelastic. Services  for which  demand  is inelastic  means  that  demand  does  not increase  much  with
income  and  that  these  services  are used  more  by the poor. For  example,  in Viet Nam  the
demand  for commune  health  centers  is highly  income  inelastic,  while  the  demand  for hospital  care
is income  elastic  (Gertler  and Litvack,  1996). This means  keeping  subsidies  high  at health
centers,  and low  for hospital  outpatient  services  will better  target  subsides  to the poor.
25The  Viet Nam  results  are likely  to be  true in most  countries-i.e. that  the demand  for
health  center  care is the most  inelastic  with respect  to income,  especially  in rural  areas. This
suggest  that increasing  subsidies  for health  centers  in rural areas  best  targets  subsidies  to the
poor. It also  suggests  a general  pricing  structure  in which  fees  are lower  (and subsidies  higher)  if
the patient  enters  the system  at the lowest  level,  and  progressively  higher  the  further up  the
system  the patient  enters.  If an individual  first goes  to the  commune  health  centers  and  requires  a
higher  level  of care at  the hospital,  the registration  fees are  waived  (or at least  lower)  at the
hospital. Thus,  this pricing  structure  provides  an affordable  portal  of entry  into  the health  care
system  through  the  commune  health  centers  and  allows  those  willing  to pay  to bypass  the
commune  health  center  and  go directly  to higher  levels  of care. Since  it is the non-poor  who are
willing  to pay  to bypass  the lower  levels,  they  will be  charged  higher  prices  and receive  lower
subsidies.
Policies  can take advantage  of  self-selection  if a wider  range  of instruments  are
considered. If the  adequacy  of medical  treatment  is maintained,  government  facilities  may
deliberately  offer  fewer  amenities  so that only  the  poor  would  choose  to use  them.  This requires
accepting  different  quality  levels  of  service  (at least  from the  consumers'  satisfaction  stand point)
in order  to concentrate  more  resources  on  the poor.
Indicator  Targeting.  Finally,  one method  of charging  those most  able  to pay  at least  the
full cost of care  is to target  identifiable  groups. One  specific  group  that  may be able  to afford care
is the insured  population.  Insurance  status  is a good  indicator  of those  most  able  to pay because
the insured  are wealthier  than  the general  population.  For  example,  in Indonesia  civil servants  are
covered  by insurance  and almost  all civil  servants  are in  the top half  of the income  distribution
(World  Bank, 1995).  However,  the  insurance  company  pays  less  than  the full cost  of care so that
public  system  still subsidizes  the  wealthy  insured  population.  This situation  exists  in most
countries  with mixed  public  private  systems. By charging  the full cost  of care  to insured  patients,
public  systems  reduce  subsidies  to the non-poor  allowing  them  to reallocate  them  to services
used by  the poor.
4.4  Adjusting Resource Allocation to Insure Against Financial Risk
The classic  reason  for most  developed  countries  to intervene  in health  markets  is the
inherent  uncertainty  in health  status  (Arrow,  1963). No  one knows  what  tomorrow  will bring.
Seemingly  healthy  individuals  can  be struck  by cancer,  injured  in accidents  or experience  bouts of
severe  diarrhea. The uncertainty  is compounded  the longer  one looks  into  the  future and  the less
one  knows  about  one's  current  health. While  most  families  are able  to finance  routine  care out of
their  own  budgets,  most  are not  able to finance  the rare  but  expensive  incidents.  In fact, in all
countries,  expenditures  on health  care  are extremely  skewed  in that a quite  small  proportion  of
the population  accounts  for a large  fraction  of  total expenditures.  Therefore,  while most  families
have  only small  expenditures  in a given  year,  a relatively  small  number  have  very large
expenditures.
Given  aversion  to risk individuals  would  prefer  to have  predictable  health  care
expenditures.  Predictable  health  care  expenditure  relieve  the  worry  of how  one  will finance  costly
unexpected  illnesses  and  allow  families  to better  plan  other consumption.  Thus,  individuals  will
seek  to insure  themselves  against  the financial  loss  associated  with uncertain  illness. Without
formal  health  insurance  individuals  would  have  to informally  finance  the  losses  out of accumulated
savings,  transfers  from relatives  and  friends,  credit  markets,  or help  from  charities.
However,  informal  insurance  seems  to be inadequate.  Using  household  panel  data  from
Indonesia,  Gertler  and  Gruber  (1996)  show  that  these  informal  sources  of insurance  are not
sufficient  for Indonesians  to be  able  to fully finance  the costs  of severe  illnesses.  They find  that
when  illnesses  are severe  enough  to affect  labor  supply  and  income,  the economic  costs  of
illnesses  are in part financed  by reduction  in  the family's  consumption  of non-medical  goods  and
26services. As a result,  there  is demand  for insurance  for both  the  medical  and income  costs
associated  with illness.
Despite  the  demand,  most  individuals  are unable  to buy  insurance  from private  sources
due to market  failure  from adverse  selection  (Rothschild  and  Stiglitz,  1978).  Adverse  selection
arises  from insurers  not  being  able  to observe  heterogeneity  in the population  regarding  health
status. Individuals  are born  with different  genetic  makeup's  making  them  more  or less
predisposed  towards  illness,  and  have  different  life course  experiences  with respect  to exposure
to environmental  contagion  and  accidents. For  both  reasons  there is substantial  variation  in  the
propensity  to become  ill. Because  insurers  do not  observe  each  individual's  propensity  to become
ill,  they cannot  write individual-specific  contracts,  but  rather  are forced  to offer the best
community-rated  insurance  plans. The terms  of these  contracts  can be  quite unfavorable  to
relatively  healthy  individuals.  The good  risks  tend  to subsidize  the bad  risks,  and  the  value  of the
insurance  to the  goods  risks,  or healthy  people,  drops  significantly.  The incentive  is for the  good
risks  to drop out  of the market,  leaving  the bad  risks  to insure  among  themselves  thereby
substantially  driving  up the  cost  of insurance,  making  if a financially  bad  deal  for both  insurers  and
beneficiaries.  Frequently,  they are so bad  that  the market  fails  to exist  at all.
The opposite  problem  is "risk-rating"  or "cream-skimming"  which  occurs  when individuals
of poor health  are observable.  Competing  on  their  ability  to select  good  risks  leads  insurers  to
avoid  insuring  individuals  with  "pre-existing"  conditions  such  as cancer  or AIDS  who are 'certain"
bad  risks  who  will have  predictably  high  medical  care  expenditures.  Insurers  do not  want  to
provide  these individuals  with coverage  at the  community  rated  (average)  premiums.  Instead  they
either  explicitly  deny  coverage  or effectively  deny  coverage  by charging  a premium  approximately
equal  to the cost  of care. In many  high risk cases,  the actuarially  fair  cost  of insurance  (expected
expenditures  plus  a loading  factor  to cover  administrative  costs)  may be  prohibitively  expensive
12 and  these individuals  are effectively  uninsured
Insurance  market  failure  due  to adverse  selection  occurs  when  insurance  is voluntary
rather  than  compulsory.  The problems  of  adverse  selection  and  cream-skimming  do not  occur
when  everyone  is in the insurance  pool. Most  countries  correct  the insurance  market  failure
through  either  a universal  public  system  with  subsidized  low  prices  or through  compulsory  social
insurance  in which  the poor's  enrollment  is subsidized.
In public  systems,  heavily  subsidized  public  hospitals  provide  insurance  against  large
financial  loss  associated  with a catastrophic  illness. However,  public  systems  provide  lower  levels
of insurance  if they provide  lower  quality  than  what  could  be  bought  in the private  sector  with
social  insurance  funds.
The debate  over  whether  to increase  user  fees in hospitals  has  ignored  the  crucial  role
public  subsidies  serve  as insurance.  Subsidies  can reduce  risk in two ways. First,  they can make
the costs  more predictable  by spreading  the medical  care  costs of uncertain  illness  across  healthy
and  sick times. Taxes incurred  in all states  of health  finance  medical  care purchased  when  sick.
As a result,  raising  user  fees  in a world  of imperfect  consumption  insurance  has  an important
welfare  cost: Higher  user  fees "tax  families  while  they are down,"  imposing  higher  costs  at exactly
the point  where  the marginal  utility (value  of the  next unit)  of consumption  is highest. Second,
subsidies  may help  mitigate  the loss  of income  from  the illness  by financing  the use  of medical
care  that  improves  health  and  productivity.  In essence,  the public  subsidies  relax  credit
constraints  on  the purchase  of medical  care  that  may help  one  get back  to work  faster.
Public  subsidies  for medical  care  can  correct  failure  in the  insurance  market,  because
private  markets  are unlikely  to supply  adequate  insurance  because  of adverse  selection.
12 This  problem  is  exacerbated  given  that  insurance  contracts  are  written  for  limited  terms  (e.g.  one  year).  Over  time  as
more  and more  high  risk individuals  contract  serious  illness,  the number  of high  risk individuals  able  to obtain  insurance
declines.  With population  aging  increasing  the number  of individuals  with long-term  chronic  illnesses,  and improvements
in genetic  testing  and  long-range  diagnosis,  the number  of individuals  denied  coverage  can only  grow.
27Insurance  principles  suggest  that  the subsidies  should  go to the services  that  provide  care  for the
rare,  high-cost  illness  that  wreak  the  most havoc  on family  budgets.
Given  that  the relatively  wealthy  disproportionately  use hospital  services  under current
systems,  there is a distinct  tradeoff  between  equity  and  efficiency  in subsidized  hospital  care.  This
can be mitigated  by enforcing  strict  referral  rules  requiring  very high  charges  for those  entering
hospitals  directly  with generous  exemptions  for those  who  are properly  referred.
The introduction  of insurance  carries  with it another  market  failure  called  moral  hazard:
the insured  may be induced  to use more  services  that they  would  otherwise,  because  their price
at the point  of service  is lower  than  without  insurance. In  this case,  patients  tend to consume
medical  care  beyond  the point  where  the  additional  benefit  is greater  than  or equal  to the
additional  cost. In this sense,  too many  resources  are being  allocated to the treatment.  The
greater  the price  elasticity  of demand,  the  larger  the  welfare  loss  from moral  hazard.
It is interesting  to note  that  the implications  for pricing  policy  the different  forms  of market
failure in health  are themselves  quite  different;  indeed  may be  complete  opposites.  When  adverse
selection  prevents  the  emergence  of insurance  markets,  public  policy  should  promote  a pricing
structure  that protects  against  catastrophic  loss. This  will typically  include  significant  copayments
by the insured  for small  expenditures  with stop-loss  provisions  (caps on  the maximum  out of
pocket  cost)  for large  expenditures.  This  takes  care  of the  welfare  loss  from assuming  too much
risk.  On the other  hand,  when  moral  hazard  is a serious  problem,  people  should  face the  true
costs  on the margin  to limit  overuse  of services. The risk problem  needs  to be handled  by
relatively  large,  inframarginal  payments  (Zeckhauser  1970). The  first problem  leads  to an optimal
payment  policy  of a large  copayment  for small  expenditure  and  none  for large  while  the second
argues  for low (or zero)  copayment  for pretty  much  all of expected  costs  with a large  exposure
(full  cost burden)  beyond  that point. Since  such  different  policy  conclusions  follow from  different
institutional  structures,  a great  deal  of knowledge  about  the  way markets  work  is necessary  for
good policy  formulation.
The allocation  of public  subsidies  in most  countries  is consistent  with trying  to ameliorate
losses  from private  insurance  market  failure  since  the bulk  of public  subsidies  is spent on
hospitals.  However,  the  level  of public  subsidy  does  not seem  to be enough  to adequately  insure
families  against  the risk of financial  loss  from unexpected  ill-health. In  fact, despite  the large
subsidy  of public  hospitals,  individuals  are still incurring  large  out-of-pocket  expenditures.
Moreover,  Gertler  and  Gruber  (1996)  show  that  families  finance  the  economic  costs  of illness  by
reducing  consumption  in Indonesia,  a country  with  a heavily  subsidized  public  health  care  system.
As a result,  insurance  motivations  for government  intervention  are at odds  with other
values  such  as improving  health  outcomes  or ensuring  equity. Services  that improve  health
outcomes  the most  are grouped  as public  health  expenditures  and  include  immunization
campaigns  and  preventive  care. Finding  services  that  benefit  the poor  entails  looking  at what
services  they use  and at the  income  elasticity  of demand. Such  services  include  the prevention
and treatment  of infectious  disease  and  primary  care  delivered  at health  centers  in rural areas.
Protecting  the poor  from financial  risk because  of illness  argues  for subsidizing  the network  of
public  hospitals  that already  consume  generous  shares  of  the public  sector's  health  budget. In
essence,  subsidies  to hospital  provide  catastrophic  health  insurance.
5. USER  FEES  WITH  PREPAYMENT  (INSURANCE).
From  the above  discussion,  we conclude  that  while  there are  ways to mobilize  resources
through  user  fees that improve  welfare,  there are still potentially  large  costs  to such  a policy.
Specifically,  the scope  for mobilizing  private  financing  for public  expenditures  is limited  by the  two
costs:  (1) reduced  insurance  coverage  against  the risk  of financial  loss  from unexpected  illness,
and (2) reduced  utilization  and  possible  consequent  adverse  health  outcomes,  especially  for the
28poor. However,  these  costs  are much  lower  in health  systems  financed  through  Social  Insurance
(SI).
With  SI, individuals  are still insured  against  the risk of financial  loss  from illness  when
governments  raise  user  fees. Under  SI, individuals  prepay  their  medical  care  expenditures  (i.e.
premiums)  into  a fund  which is used  to pay  for their  medical  care if and  when  they becomes  ill or
injured. They  thus avoid  paying  unexpected  fees  when  ill and  are therefore  insured  against  the
risk of financial  loss  from illness. With insurance,  individuals  medical  care  expenditures
(premiums)  are predictable  and  can be planned.  Governments  mobilize  private  resources  by
raising  the  fees charged  insurance  plans  for health  services  provided  by the plan's  beneficiaries.
Because  increases  in fees raise  premiums  and  not  the out-of-pocket  charges  at the time  of
treatment,  there is no loss  in the insurance  value  from raising  fees.  Raising  fees still causes  a loss
in welfare  as families  must  pay increased  premiums  at the expense  of other  consumption  or
savings,  but  that  loss is predictable  and  can be spread  throughout  the year  and  across  individuals.
The problem  of equity  in access  to medical  does  not  disappear  without  government
subsidy  with the  introduction  of Si. However,  using  government  subsidies  to improve  equity  in
access  to medical  care  is fundamentally  easier  in the  context  of Si. The policy mechanism  is for
the government  to subsidize  the  enrollment  of the  poor into  the insurance  plans. For this to be
budget  neutral,  subsidies  directly  provided  to facilities  would  have  to be reduced  to finance  the
enrollment  of the poor  in the insurance  plan. Facilities  would  then  recoup  the lost  revenues
through  providing  care  for insured  patients  and being  reimbursed.  In  this way, public  subsidies
would  be better  targeted  to the  poor,  and  the facilities  who  get the  subsidies  would  be  the ones
who  care  for the poor. The administration  of  this program  would  be  easier  than  price
discrimination  by facilities  at the  time  care is needed,  because  it would  be  centralized,  because  it
would  only  need  to be  done  periodically  outside  the pressure  of having  to  treat an  illness,  and
because  it could  be  done  by a trained  dedicated  staff  that  did not have  other responsibilities.
While  social  insurance  holds  promise  for correcting  some  of  the problems  created  by
resource  mobilization  policy,  it creates  a host  of other problems  that,  if not  addressed  as part of
insurance  design,  could  outweigh  its benefit.  The most  obvious  problem,  already  raised  earlier,  is
that SI  cannot  be voluntary.  Voluntary  insurance  markets  fail due  to adverse  selection.  For  SI
plans  to be financial  viable,  enrollment  must  be  compulsory.  This is not  to say that  they need  to
enroll  the  whole populations,  but rather  segments  of  the population  such  as the  wage  sector.  In
fact, most  countries  already  have  compulsory  Si for civil  servants,  many  expanded  compulsory
coverage  to wage  sector  employees,  and a few have  achieved  universal  coverage.  In addition  to
adverse  selection,  there  are a number  of other  important  design  and  administration  issues  that  are
beyond  the  scope  of  this paper.
6. CONCLUSIONS
*  User  fees are not  yet but  have  the potential  to be powerful  means  of improving  efficiency  in
the health  care  systems  of developing  countries.
*  Optimal  fee structures  can differ  dramatically  from one  institutional  setting  to another.
Countries  differ  significantly  by  the size  and  performance  of  the private  sector,  the nature  of
markets  for insurance,  credit  and  medical  care  and  the administrative  capacity  of the public
sector  to run or regulate  health  services.  Therefore,  much more  serious  analysis  based  on
real  data  is needed  in order  to define  better  policies.
*  In many  countries,  public  sector  health  budgets  are determined  reactively:  demands  for
curative  care must  be honored  and  funds  for population-based  public  goods  are determined
residually.  In  these  cases,  fees for curative  care  can conserve  resources  for use on  these
public  goods,  improving  efficiency,  health  status  impact  of public  expenditure  and,  due  to the
incidence  of infectious  disease,  equity  as well.
29*  Most  countries  have  a relatively  large  private  sectors  providing  primary  health  care. Effective
use  of public  funds  should  complement  rather  than  crowd  out  private  activity.  Large  subsidies
for relatively  inexpensive  services  may  add little  to the net  improvement  of health  status  if they
are strong  substitutes  for privata  care.
*  In  the many  countries  in which insurance  markets  are not  going  to be fixed  in the near  future,
hospitals  should  remain  an important  expenditure  item  for the public  sector.  This is a way  to
protect  people  from  catastrophic  loss  in the absence  of formal  insurance  systems.  The
skewness  of demand  for services,  with relatively  few people  requiring  very expensive  care,
implies  that hospitals  will be  a large  part  of the budget.
*  Many  countries  will find  that  the optimal  allocation  of health  subsidies  will involve  large  public
subsidies  for non-clinical  public  good, fees at primary  health  care  facilities  to conserve  public
resources  for these  goods,  and  large  per unit  subsidies  to hospital  services  with  a proper
referral  system. Such  a system  entails  patients  referred  on  the basis  of clinical  need  and
very high  fees for those using  hospitals  as the  first point  of contact.  Note  this is almost  the
exact  opposite  price  and subsidy  scheme  as that implied  by  current  emphasis  on Primary
Health  Care.
*  In  those countries  in which  social  insurance  or adequately  regulated  private  insurance
markets  exist,  optimal  policies  would  involve  very few subsidies  to hospital  services. These
would  be covered  by actuarially  fair pre-payments.
e  Retention  of revenue  at local  levels  is essential  for quality  improvement  effects  of user  fees.
e  Uniform  price  rises  will reduce  use  of facilities  more  for the poor  than  for others.  To the extent
that this is socially  undesirable,  adequate  protection  for the poor must  come  from  targeted
interventions,  as imperfect  as current  methods  of targeting  may be.  Health  care is highly
income  elastic  and  any uniform  subsidy  system  is likely  to be  regressive.
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